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Abstract
Three Essays on Ethical Corporate Behavior
Sonal Kumar, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2020
The first essay extends the literature on how social and organizational discrimination in the form
of glass ceiling, interact with managerial traits in shaping observed leadership effectiveness1. We
show that when the population of CEOs is stratified by ethnicity and gender, the colored female
CEO emerges as the best performing while the white male CEO is consigned among the worst per-
formers. Additionally, the transition from male to female CEOs seems to follow corporate down-
turn and precede an upturn. Furthermore, the upswing is strongest following a transition from
white male to colored female CEO. We attribute these observed differences between the groups
to the existence of the glass ceiling. Discriminatory selection and promotion process potentially
imposes much higher demands on candidates belonging to the discriminated group. Thus, the level
of ability of the successful average colored female is much higher than those of the average white
male CEO. These results potentially have important implications for both policy and research.
The second essay examines whether gender discrimination after women are elevated to posi-
tions of power impacts financial reporting quality2. Specifically, we extend the literature by using
role congruity theory and glass cliff hypothesis to examine the earnings management behavior of
female chief executive officers (CEOs) conditional on the power they hold. We find that female
CEOs do not necessarily reduce earnings management. For CEOs holding less power, women
CEOs demonstrate lower earnings management relative to their male counterparts. However with
increased power, we find women and male CEOs to exhibit similar earnings management behav-
iors. Thus, the earnings management behaviors of women CEOs are not solely dictated by their
risk-taking and ethical attitudes, but by the existence of glass cliffs which imposes high demands
on women CEOs to conform to their gender roles.
1Based on paper with Rahul Ravi, Sandra Betton and Gillian Leithman
2Based on paper with Rahul Ravi
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The final essay examines the stock price changes to the firm’s strategic choice towards sym-
bolic and substantive CSR3. Our results indicate that stock prices react differently to symbolic
and substantive CSR. Symbolic CSR is used as a means to repair reputational damage following a
corporate controversy and attracts a positive stock price change consistent with stakeholder wealth
maximization theory. In contrast, substantive CSR, undertaken to conform long-term commitment
towards CSR is perceived as over-investment by managers in the manifestation of agency leading
to a negative stock return-substantive CSR relation. However, no such negative relation between
stock returns and substantive CSR is found for a subset of family firms, where the controlling fam-
ilies have a personal interest in the long-term performance of the firm. Overall, the results indicate
that the stock market responds to the nature of CSR activities.
3Based on the paper with Rahul Ravi and Nilanjan Basu
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Glass ceiling is a metaphor for hard-to-see informal barriers that keep women and minorities to
rise to the upper rungs of the corporate sector irrespective of their qualifications and achievements.
The representation of women at top executive positions is steadily increasing. The existing empiri-
cal literature increasingly explores the differential impact of gender on various corporate outcomes.
However, an important question underlying the effect of women leadership is whether fundamental
differences in genders drives firm outcomes. The prior literature compares male and female lead-
ers, assuming their career trajectories are the same, disregarding the real obstacles women face on
their route to the top. This thesis addresses how social and racial discrimination in the form of
glass ceiling shape managerial traits and impacts firm performance, corporate social responsibility
and earnings management in two separate studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. We
further extend the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature by examining the relationship be-
tween a firm’s stock returns and CSR based on intent or motive behind CSR initiations presented
in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 2 (Essay 1), we examine whether glass ceiling faced by women and minorities on
their route to top executive positions impact firm performance and corporate social responsibility.
Evolving gender and demographic diversity within C-suites have led finance researchers to study
how gender differences result in the superior performance of female leaders in comparison to their
male counterparts (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011; Kim and Starks 2016;
Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2016). However, the existing studies comparing male and female
leaders assume that their career trajectories are the same, disregarding the discriminatory glass
ceiling women and minorities face on the route to the top. Glass ceilings act as discriminatory
filters which permit only above average women to occupy top executive roles. Comparing them to
their male counterparts, who have not had to go through discriminatory filters, is unlikely to yield
comparable results. We find that when the population of CEOs is stratified by ethnicity and gender,
the colored female CEO emerges as the best performing while the white male CEO is consigned
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among the worst performers.
In this study, we argue that empirical, comparative gender research suffers from a joint hy-
pothesis problem. The better performance of female leaders could be the result of superiority of
one gender over the other or it may be the result of discriminatory filters that permit only above
average women and minorities to occupy leadership positions. In the first hypothesis, we therefore
surmise that based on glass ceiling hypothesis, average female or ethnic minority who makes it to
the top CEO position has had to go through relatively higher levels of scrutiny and accountability,
vis-à-vis others and is more likely to possesses superior qualifications and/or abilities in compar-
ison to other CEOs and hence demonstrate superior performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s
Q. In addition to discriminatory barriers preventing the advancement of women and minorities,
the glass cliff hypothesis (Ryan and Haslam 2007) asserts that occupational minorities are more
likely to accept CEO positions in organizations that are struggling, in crisis or at risk of failing. In
the second hypothesis, we posit that occupational minorities are more likely to be hired as CEOs
for organizations in crisis, but because they possess superior leadership abilities, the average firm
performance post their appointment improves. We show that when the population of CEOs is
stratified by ethnicity and gender, the colored female CEO emerges as the best performing while
the white male CEO is consigned among the worst performers. Additionally, the transition from
male to female CEO seems to follow corporate downturn and precede an upturn. Furthermore, the
upswing is strongest following a transition from white male to a colored female CEO. We attribute
these observed differences between the groups to the existence of the glass ceiling. Discriminatory
selection and promotion process potentially imposes much higher demands on candidates belong-
ing to the discriminated group. Thus, the level of ability of the successful average colored female
is much higher than those of the average white male CEO.
We further show the role of glass ceiling in shaping CSR initiations by CEOs. Researchers
commonly distinguish between substantive and symbolic CSR strategies (Oliver 1991; Okhma-
tovskiy and David 2012). Substantive CSR strategies involve complete CSR implementation. The
firm’s underlying systems and processes are altered in a holistic attempt to improve the status
quo of a particular societal or environmental context. In contrast, symbolic CSR allows firms to
attend to stakeholder demands without making substantive changes to their systems and opera-
tions, allowing firms to maintain legitimacy without significant strategic change (Myers, Myers,
and Skinner 2007). In the third and fourth hypotheses, we surmise that occupational minority
CEOs initiate higher symbolic and substantive CSR. CSR can be strategically used by minorities
to strengthen relations with stakeholders, attain job security and reduce CEO turnover. To deal
with inherent endogeneity and causal inferences, we follow the prior literature and estimate the
results using propensity score matched sample and find the results to persist.
We believe that this study contributes positively to the discussion on gender and equality in
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the workplace in at least two ways. First: it highlights the problem of discrimination against
occupational minorities rather than just gender. Our results show that over the last decade, the
proportion of women in corporate leadership has increased. However, almost all the increase
seems to be coming from a simultaneous decrease in the proportion of non-white men CEOs.
This is one diversity replacing another. Second: Psychology research seems to suggest that once
the social stereotypes and expectations are removed from the equation, the male and the female
gender tend to be more alike than different. However when the bulk of the research is attempting to
find differences between the genders, this can potentially orient society and organizations towards
finding differences while downplaying the similarities. If so, they can be sometimes used to support
prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory actions against one-group vs another.
In Chapter 3 (Essay 2), we examine whether gender discrimination after women have elevated
to positions of power impacts financial reporting quality. An increasing number of women have
successfully shackled the glass ceiling by reaching the upper echelons of the corporate sectors.
Several studies examine the potential barriers women face on their way to the top as well as the
role of women in shaping corporate outcomes (Cook and Glass 2014; Adams and Ferreira 2009;
Kim and Starks 2016). Recently, scholarly attention has also shifted towards understanding the po-
tential barriers women face in the form of glass cliffs after attaining senior corporate roles (Bowles
2012; Glass and Cook 2016). Role congruity theory (Eagly, Wood, and Diekman 2000) suggests
that individuals are judged for congruence between their characteristics dictated by their gender
stereotypes and the requirements of the job that they occupy.
In this essay, we examine whether differences in discrimination men and women CEOs face
impact their earnings management behaviors. Specifically, we extend the literature by using role
congruity theory and glass cliff hypothesis to examine the earnings management behavior of female
chief executive officers (CEOs) conditional on the power they hold. Based on the above arguments,
our paper aims to examine two key research questions. Firstly, we examine the impact of CEO
gender on earnings management. Although previous studies have examined the effect of gender
diverse boards on earnings management, the impact of CEO gender on earnings management is
still debatable given the mixed evidence in the literature (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011; Cumming,
Leung, and Rui 2015; Ye, Zhang, and Rezaee 2010; Yu et al. 2010).
Secondly, we consider if discrimination in the form of glass cliffs shape earnings management
behavior of women CEOs. Prior studies document the success of CEOs in manipulating perfor-
mance critically depends on their power to influence decisions (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988;
Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2005). Powerful CEOs are found to pressurize CFOs to report bi-
ased earnings and are subject to weaker board monitoring, reduced scrutiny and a higher incentive
to withhold information from the shareholders (Fracassi and Tate 2012). Given that power can
act as a stimulus that can shift managers’ focus, we hypothesize that CEO gender and earnings
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management relationship distorts with increased CEO power. That is, in a powerful CEO setting,
women CEOs are subject to less scrutiny and have an opportunity to influence the decision-making
process. We find women CEOs do not necessarily reduce earnings management. For CEOs holding
less power, women CEOs demonstrate lower earnings management relative to their male counter-
parts. However with increased power, we find women and male CEOs to exhibit similar earnings
management behaviors. Thus, the earnings management behaviors of women CEOs are not solely
dictated by their risk-taking and ethical attitudes, but by the existence of glass cliffs which imposes
high demands on women CEOs to conform to their gender roles.
Consistent with prior gender studies, our study faces the challenges of small female CEO sam-
ple size, selection bias and omitted variable concerns. To address these endogeneity concerns, we
rely on methodological techniques accepted in the literature, including propensity score match-
ing, instrumental variable approach and difference-in-difference analysis. Our results are robust to
these techniques and support our hypotheses.
Our study has important practical implications. Its main contribution is to the literature on
corporate gender diversity as we provide additional evidence of how behavioral aspects of women
CEOs can affect corporate policies. Our study identifies a previously unexplored factor: “glass
cliff”, as an important factor dictating earnings management behavior of women CEOs. We also
add to the growing line of research on the impact of managerial characteristics on corporate out-
comes. Finally, our study is also related to the literature on the economic consequences of powerful
CEOs on earnings management. Consistent with (Fracassi and Tate 2012), we find powerful CEOs
are subject to weaker board monitoring, can influence decisions and exert pressure to report biased
performance measures.
In Chapter 4 (Essay 3), we examine the relation between stock price changes and firm’s strate-
gic choice towards symbolic and substantive CSR. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has con-
tinued to gain importance in managerial practice over the last several decades. And yet, despite
years of research, the relationship between the market valuation of a firm and its CSR activities
remains unclear (Margolis and Walsh 2003; McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright 2006). While early
studies treated CSR as an obligation on businesses to pursue policies that are desirable in terms of
the objectives and values of society, subsequent ones contend that CSR is ‘fundamentally subver-
sive’ of the true responsibilities of business.
Prior literature provides two opposing views of CSR that influences the relation between CSR
and market value of firms. Stakeholder value maximization theory (Friedman 1970) proposes that
the aim of the corporation is stakeholder wealth maximization and management should consider
the effects of their actions on customers, suppliers, employees and other stakeholders. This line of
study advocates that investment in CSR to balance social goals along with shareholder wealth max-
imization will lead to a positive market reaction. In contract, the over-investment theory (Barnea
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and Rubin 2010) suggests that shareholders associate investment in CSR as a means by manage-
ment to extract private benefits from the firm and build their personal reputation. Based on agency
theory, insiders over-invest in CSR to be entrenched as socially responsible managers at the ex-
pense of shareholders and lead to negative market reaction.
This paper provides a new perspective by focusing directly on the relationship between a firm’s
stock price performance and CSR based on intent or motive behind CSR initiations. Firms strategi-
cally utilize symbolic and substantive CSR to either repair reputational damage following negative
societal events or undertake actions intended to integrate CSR in the overall business objectives.
We find that the market responds positively to symbolic CSR while negatively to substantive
CSR. Media attention towards negative firm events puts a corporation’s reputation at risk and the
firm’s engagement in symbolic CSR acts as a quick response from the firm to show that it is doing
something to ‘fix the problem’. Substantive CSR, on the other hand often requires subsequent
changes in operations, systems and processes. The cost of implementing substantive CSR may
be higher than the benefits in the short-term and leads shareholders’ to view it as a manifestation
of agency conflict. Further, we shed light on shareholders’ sensitivity to changes in symbolic and
substantive CSR over the sample period. Consistent with (Flammer 2012), we find that the intensity
of stock market reaction to negative events and CSR initiations is different. With increased external
pressure to conform to societal objectives, initiation in symbolic CSR is rewarded less by the stock
market over time, but firms are punished more for negative events.
Our findings have several interesting implications for the literature on CSR activity. First, we
find that crucial differences underlying CSR activities impact subsequent stock returns. Second,
and perhaps more interestingly, we provide a detailed description of how the stock market reacts
to CSR based on the intent or motivation behind CSR activities. Our results indicate that there is a
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers towards the optimal level of CSR activity.
Third, we also fill the gap in the existing CSR firm value relation literature. The existing empirical
literature studying the impact of CSR on firm value yields mixed evidence with some evidence
pointing towards a positive impact of CSR on firm value while some finding negative or no market
value CSR relationship. We extend the literature by showing that the stock market reaction to CSR
depends on the motve behind specific CSR initiations.
The last piece of work in the thesis, Chapter 5 provides the concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Breaking through Glass Ceiling:
Occupational minority CEOs and firm
performance
2.1. Introduction
As of late there has been much discussion in the finance literature about gender differences in the
C-suite and the superior performance of female leaders in comparison to their male counterparts.
The mere comparison of female and male leaders, however, assumes that their career trajecto-
ries are the same, disregarding the real obstacles women face on route to the top. A term that is
often used to describe this phenomenon is known as the glass ceiling effect. The Federal Glass
Ceiling Commission (1995) defines the glass ceiling as "artificial barriers to the advancement of
women and minorities." The Commission further asserts, “The glass ceiling is the "unseen, yet un-
breachable barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate
ladder, regardless of their qualifications or achievements". (Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund 1995)
maintains, "the glass ceiling hypothesis is not simply a claim about the existence of discrimination
within hierarchies; it claims that such discrimination increases as one moves up the hierarchy".
Thus, if aspiring women and minorities manage to break through the barriers imposed upon them
as they work their way up the chain of command, then comparing them to their male counter-
parts, who have not had to face the same challenges and obstacles, is unlikely to yield comparable
differences.
According to (Wellington, Kropf, and Gerkovich 2003), the glass ceiling metaphor implies
that the only career barriers women face are those that prevent their advancement. However, these
researchers maintain, glass walls and lateral barriers exist at almost every organizational level,
limiting women’s career opportunities from the very beginning. Under such conditions women
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who aspire and attain corporate leadership positions may be very different from those who do
not. This study attempts to shed light on the influence of the glass ceiling and its effect on the
performance of corporate leaders.
A growing body of empirical research explores the differential impact of gender in various
corporate settings. For example, (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011; Kim and
Starks 2016) findings indicate that gender diversity among top management teams and boards of
directors positively affects firm performance.1 (Cumming, Leung, and Rui 2015) results indicate
that the presence of women on a board of directors reduces corporate misconduct. Their findings
also suggest that women are more effective in reducing the frequency and severity of fraud in male-
dominated industries. Similarly,(Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011; Francis et al. 2015) find that gender
diversity among top management teams and the board of directors improves a firm’s accounting
policies. According to (Levi, Li, and Zhang 2014) results, each additional female director is as-
sociated with 7.6% fewer bids, and each additional female director on a bidder board reduces the
bid premium paid by 15.4%. Their findings support the notion that female directors help create
shareholder value through their influence on acquisition decisions.
In addition, research examining the relationship between top corporate executives and corpo-
rate decisions, indicates that women make more sound investment decisions. For example, accord-
ing to (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2016) firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less
volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms run by male CEOs.
The authors attribute this finding to lower risk-taking tendencies of the female leadership.(Huang
and Kisgen 2013) reveals that female CEOs make fewer acquisitions.
In contrast to the above stream of research, a growing body of psychological research suggests
that there are no significant differences between men and women. Findings from a review of 46
meta-analytic studies investigating gender differences reveal that there are few psychological dif-
ferences between the genders. In fact, the author argues and cites evidence in favor of the gender
similarities hypothesis (Hyde 2005), that is men and women, boys and girls, are more similar than
they are different. A few notable exceptions include motor performance (i.e., throwing velocity
and throwing distance) and physical aggression. Males tend to display superior motor perfor-
mance skills and are moderately more aggressive than are females. Of course one must bear in
mind that context matters. In fact, one of the most important findings to emerge from Hyde’s anal-
ysis deserving of mention is that gender differences can and do emerge under varying conditions,
however, they can also disappear and be reversed. For example, in a study conducted by (Spencer,
Steele, and Quinn 1999), female college students who excelled at math performed worse than their
male colleagues on a challenging math test when told gender differences existed on the assessment.
1Gender Diversity is defined as the representation of gender differences on board of directors and among the top
management team
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Yet, this finding disappeared when both groups were told there were no gender differences on the
test. Similar results have been found in experiments conducted on gender norms and aggression
(Lightdale and Prentice 1994), helping behaviors (Eagly and Crowley 1986), conversational inter-
ruption (Anderson and Leaper 1998), smiling behavior (LaFrance, Hecht, and Paluck 2003) and
most recently athletic performance (Hively and El-Alayli 2014).
In addition to context, one must also be mindful that gender differences can and do change with
age, getting smaller or larger across the lifespan (Hyde 2005). Accordingly, (Halpern 2014) main-
tains, "Even when differences are found, we cannot conclude that they are immutable because the
continuous interplay of biological and environmental influences can change the size and direction
of the effects sometime in the future."
These two bodies of research, with their diametrically opposing assertions, present something
akin to a gender puzzle. If men and women are indeed quite similar, why does the growing body
of empirical business research find so many significant differences? We suspect that the women
who attain corporate leadership positions, despite of discriminatory business practices, are quite
different from the women who choose alternate career paths. As such, we argue that the empirical,
comparative gender research suffers from a joint hypothesis problem. One hypothesis is gender.
The other is the glass ceiling. The superior performance of female executives or board members
may indeed represent the superiority of one gender over the other in such roles, or it may be the
result of discriminatory filters which permit only above average women to reach these positions.
According to (Eagly 2007), gender differences result from social prejudices and work-life bal-
ance demands. These researchers argue that a more comprehensive understanding of such dif-
ferences is better portrayed by the concept of a labyrinth rather than a ceiling because the issue
is indeed multi-dimensional.(Baxter and Wright 2000) maintain that because of the glass ceiling,
women face more obstacles when trying to move up the organizational hierarchy, and face even
greater challenges at the executive and board levels. Empirically this would suggest that a woman
in a leadership position has overcome several rounds of discriminatory filtering before arriving in a
position of power, and thus likely more qualified than her male equivalent. We therefore argue that
gender comparisons at the CEO level, without controlling for the glass ceiling effect, is potentially
flawed.
This study expands its scope beyond gender and includes racial minorities in its design. We
find that in a sample consisting of the largest corporations in the United States, the proportion of
female CEOs increased from 2.05% in 1998 to 6.6% in 2013 (Table 2.1), whereas during the same
time, non-white CEOs in the sample witnessed a minor increase from 9.11% in 1998 to 10.6%
in 2013. If we exclude CEOs with one year or less of tenure (we define them as interim), the
percentage of non-white CEOs merely increased by 1% over the sample period. The proportion of
white-male CEOs declined from 89.12% in 1998 to 87% in 2013, still occupying a majority share
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of CEO positions. We refer to the female and non-white-male CEOs as occupational minorities.2
Extant research suggests that glass-ceiling effects exist for all occupational minorities – white
women, and men and women of color. Decision-makers tend to view women and minorities as
less competent and capable of leading organizations compared to white men (Carton and Rosette
2011; Rosette, Leonardelli, and Phillips 2008). Our findings indicate that on average, the relative
performance and firm value of firms led by women of color (two levels of adverse discrimination
– gender and ethnicity) are among the best (as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q respectively),
followed by firms run by white females and non-white men. The performance of firms led by
white-men (no adverse discrimination) are the worst among the four groups. In this sample, firms
led by white female CEOs display marginally better performance compared to those led by colored
male CEOs.
The significant difference between the performance of white and the non-white male CEOs, and
those between white and non-white female CEOs, is consistent with the Glass-Ceiling hypothesis.
The potential existence of racial discrimination favors above-average non-white aspirants to reach
the top. Similarly, gender discrimination may result in the superior performance of female CEOs
in comparison to their male counterparts. For example, the on average performance of non-white
female CEOs being the best and the white male CEOs being the worst, suggests that gender and
race discriminatory practices have cumulative effects on the groups subjected to them. We find that
white-female CEOs tend to demonstrate marginally superior performance relative to non-white
male CEOs. These findings have two plausible interpretations. First, it is evidence in support of
female gender superiority in the role of corporate leadership, or, second, it is evidence that gender
discrimination is relatively more severe than ethnic discrimination.
The Glass-cliff theory proposed by (Ryan and Haslam 2007) suggests that occupational minori-
ties are more likely to accept positions of leadership in organizations that are struggling, in crisis,
or at risk to fail. They attribute this to the aspirant’s fear that they will lack better opportunities in
the future. Consistent with this hypothesis (Cook and Glass 2014) find that occupational minori-
ties—defined as white women and men and women of color—are more likely than white men to
be promoted to CEO of weakly performing firms. We contribute to this literature by studying firm
performance after the CEO transition. We find that on average, firm-performance tends to improve
when a female CEO replaces a male CEO. The same is observed when a non-white CEO replaces
a white-CEO. This result is consistent with our assertion that in the presence of discriminatory fil-
ters (Glass-Ceiling), occupational minorities making it to leadership positions are likely to possess
superior qualifications. We find that improvement in firm performance is greater when the tran-
sition is from male to female CEO, suggesting that discrimination based on gender is potentially
greater than that based on ethnicity. (Ryan, Haslam, et al. 2011) argue that in the presence of the
2(Taylor 2010) defines occupational minority, as a worker who is a numerical rarity in his or her occupation
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glass-cliff, in times of crisis, the dominant narrative of “think manager–think male” (Schein 1973)
could change to “think Crisis–think female”. Our study suggests that a more accurate response is
“Think Crisis-Think occupational minority”.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical back-
ground and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4
presents the empirical results and their discussion. Section 5 reviews several robustness tests and
Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2.2. Theory: Occupational minority and Glass ceilings
An occupation tends to take the dominant narrative of the occupational majority (Schein 1973).
The phrase occupational majority is a play on (Taylor 2010) definition of occupational minority –
as a worker who is a numerical rarity in his or her occupation. (Ryan, Haslam, et al. 2011) suggests
that the “think manager – think male” narrative uncovered by (Schein 1973) underlies many gender
inequalities in the workplace. Arguably, the cultural ideals associated with the dominant majority
are likely to affect the occupational minority (Taylor 2010). Moreover, these dominant group
effects can negatively influence the perception of the occupational minority’s abilities, interaction
with and support of the group itself. The result manifests in what is popularly referred to as the
glass ceiling effect. Thus, we maintain that in the presence of discrimination, the average female
or ethnic minority executive who makes it to the position of CEO, has had to go through relatively
higher levels of scrutiny and accountability, vis-à-vis others. Therefore, the average female or
ethnic minority CEO is likely to possess superior qualifications and/or abilities vis-à-vis other
CEOs.
2.2.1. Occupational minority and financial performance
According to (Ragins, Townsend, and Mattis 1998),99 percent of the female executives in their
study reported “consistently exceeding performance expectations” as critical or fairly important.
These women felt they needed to repeatedly prove their abilities and over-perform to counter neg-
ative assumptions. (Klenke 2003) finds that as women move into higher positions, they become
more visible and feel increasing pressure to outperform their male colleagues. (Davidson and
Cooper 1992) suggests that these women are often seen as test cases for future female leaders.
Meaning, if they do not turn around the company quickly, the probability that future female ex-
ecutives will be hired significantly decreases. We argue that such stressors drive these women
to publicly prove their capabilities, as evidenced by firm performance. Additionally, we believe
that the same discriminatory barriers that hold women back extend to all occupational minorities.
We, therefore surmise that the average female or ethnic minority executive who makes it to the
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position of CEO has had to go through relatively higher levels of scrutiny and accountability, vis-
à-vis others. Thus, it is likely that the average female or ethnic minority CEO possesses superior
qualifications and/or abilities in comparison to other CEOs.
H1: Firms run by Occupational Minority CEOs demonstrate superior performance as mea-
sured by Tobin’s Q and ROA.
2.2.2. Occupational minority and leadership in time of change
(Ryan and Haslam 2007) predicts that occupational minorities are more likely to accept leadership
positions in organizations that are struggling, in crisis, or at risk of failing because the occupational
minority candidate fears that he/she might not find a better offer. Consistent with this assertion,
(Cook and Glass 2013) find that in times of crisis, occupational minorities are more likely to be
appointed CEO. As such, we propose that if these CEOs possess superior leadership abilities then,
we should expect firm performance to improve.
H2: Occupational minorities are more likely to be appointed CEO in struggling firms. Post
their appointment, on average the firm performance improves.
2.2.3. Occupational minority and Corporate social responsibility
Barnett (Barnett 2007) defined CSR as “a discretionary allocation of corporate resources toward
improving social welfare that serves as a means of enhancing relationships with key stakehold-
ers.” According to (Dahlsrud 2008), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) includes strategies
businesses undertake that have voluntary social, environmental, and stakeholder dimensions that
exhibit a positive impact on the community, society, and/or planet. While CSR strategies were ini-
tially viewed as “do-good” activities that distract organizations from their financial goals (Karnani
2010), they are increasingly deployed to support financial goals (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar
2004; Schaefer 2008) and enhance organizational legitimacy and survival (Chiu and Sharfman
2011; Scott and Lane 2000).
Researchers commonly distinguish between substantive and symbolic CSR strategies (Okhma-
tovskiy and David 2012; Oliver 1991). Substantive CSR strategies involve complete CSR imple-
mentation. The firm’s underlying systems and processes are altered in a holistic attempt to improve
the status quo of a particular societal or environmental context such as closing the production loop
by re-using manufacturing waste as a production input. Substantive CSR is more likely when
stakeholders can monitor a firm’s activities and easily exposes strategies that are only symbolic
in nature (Campbell 2007). Symbolic CSR allows firms to attend to stakeholder demands without
making substantive changes to their systems and operations, allowing firms to maintain legitimacy
without significant strategic change (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991). Firms often deploy
11
symbolic CSR initiatives after an incident of socially irresponsible behavior is publicly exposed, or
as a way to decrease CSR pressure that requires few internal changes (Krawiec 2003). We consider
both types of CSR as valuable resources that can positively affect firm performance (Bansal 2005;
Hart 1995; Russo and Fouts 1997; Sharma and Vredenburg 1998). Substantive CSR is employed to
preserve a firm’s reputation over the long run, whereas symbolic CSR helps mitigate the short-term
consequences of a firm’s socially irresponsible actions.
Seeing how symbolic CSR can achieve short term results, it can be leveraged to attain job
security. (Barnea and Rubin 2010) argue that top management tends to over-invest in CSR activities
to build their personal reputation as good global citizens. Accordingly, (Cespa and Cestone 2007)
maintains that incumbent CEOs strategically choose CSR activities to generate support from social
and environmental activists to reduce the probability of CEO turnover in a future period. Arguably,
CEOs belonging to the occupational minority group have a higher perception of threat to their
positions and need to increase their job security. Therefore, they are more likely to invest in
symbolic CSR than other CEOs.
H3: Occupational minority CEOs initiate more Symbolic CSR.
Alternatively, CEOs can use CSR as a strategic resource to differentiate their firm’s product in
the market by signaling superior quality (Fisman, Heal, and Nair 2005; Jensen 2001; Calton and
Payne 2003; Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006) suggest that CSR can also be used as a strategic
resource to mitigate the potential conflict of interest between the firm’s investing, and non-investing
stakeholders. The argument being reduced agency problems among various stakeholders’ should
result in higher financial performance for the firm. This is a long-term perspective and therefore
is more likely to be related to substantive CSR. Various studies looking into the moral and ethical
compass of female vs male managers claim that women tend to have stronger moral standards
than men (Eagly and Carli 2003). Therefore, we would expect female CEOs to invest more in
substantive CSR. Studies relating board diversity and CSR suggest that the presence of females and
ethnic minority directors is positively related to corporate philanthropy (Coffey and Wang 1998;
Webb 2004; Williams 2003; Siciliano 1996). These studies indicate that women and minority
directors are more interested in the welfare of various stakeholders. If this is indeed the case, we
expect to find a positive relationship between occupational minority CEO and substantive CSR
programs.
H4: Occupational minority CEOs initiate more Substantive CSR.
2.3. Data and Methodology
Our empirical analysis focuses on large US publicly traded companies. We obtain our data set
from different sources. CEO and board related variables are from Institutional Shareholder Ser-
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vices (ISS) database (contains data on S&P 1500 firms). Variables relating to corporate social
responsibility (CSR) are formulated using MSCI KLD database (covers the largest 3000 US public
firms). Further, firm performance variables and other control variables are from COMPUSTAT. Af-
ter merging data from all these sources, our final sample consists of 11,605 firm-year observations
for the period from 1998 to 2013.
2.3.1. CEO gender and ethnicity
We identify CEO gender and ethnicity, based on indicator variables available in ISS database. ISS
provides biographical information, skills, affiliations, memberships, ownership and positions held
pertaining to various directors on firm board for S&P 1500 firms. We form a gender indicator
variable CEO female (CEO Fem) that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a female, zero otherwise.
Information on ethnicity classifies each officer into African-American, Asian, Caucasian, Hispanic,
Middle-Eastern, Native American and Unknown. We remove all observations where the CEO’s
ethnicity is ‘Unknown’ to avoid incorrect identification. We collapse these categories into two
broad ethnic groups: Caucasian (CEO White) and non-Caucasian. (CEO Non-white). All non-
white CEOs are identified as those belonging to the ethnic minority group. We categorize all
female CEOs and non-white male CEOs as occupational minorities.(Cook and Glass 2014)
Table 2.1 provides the distribution of CEOs categorized on gender and ethnicity. Panel A of
Table 2.1 shows that there has been an increase in women CEOs as well as ethnic minority CEOs
over the sample period. For instance, non-white female CEOs witnessed a significant increase from
0.29% in 1998 to 4.06% in 2013 while the proportion of white female CEOs increased from 1.76%
in 1998, peaked at 3.21% in 2006 and declining to 2.50% in 2013. (Ballinger and Marcel 2010)
suggests that many firms are unable to smoothly transition to a new CEO frequently resorting to
interim CEOs. We follow (Ballinger and Marcel 2010; Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2016) to define
an interim CEO as the one who holds the title of a CEO for less than two years. Panel A of 2.1 also
reports the distribution of CEOs excluding interim CEOs. We find occupational minorities to hold
more interim CEO positions relative to white male CEOs. For example, the proportion of female
non-white CEOs decreased from 4.06% in 2013 to 3.56% excluding interim CEOs. However, the
overall proportion of white male CEOs remains unchanged after excluding interim CEOs.
Panel B of Table 2.1 presents the statistics across 10 Fama-French Industries (Financial Indus-
try and Utilities excluded). There is notable difference across industries in terms of occupational
minority leadership. Specifically, more women CEOs are employed in the Wholesale industry
(3.25%) followed by Consumer Non-Durables and Healthcare. The distribution of firm-year ob-
servations with non-white CEOs also varies across industries ranging from 0.75% in Consumer
Durables to 3.11% in Telephone and Television Transmission Industries.
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2.3.2. Corporate social responsibility
Our CSR data stems from the MSCI Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database, which has
been extensively used in prior research (Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, and Eilert 2013; Krüger
2015; Waddock and Graves 1997). The KLD data is well suited for CSR research because it is
based upon multiple aspects of CSR (Waddock and Graves 1997). Firms are rated based upon
their strengths and concerns in seven major categories – environment, community, human rights,
employee relations, diversity, product, and governance. Thus, the KLD dataset collects CSR data
for a total of fourteen indicators (please refer to Appendix D for an overview). We do not include
strengths and concerns related to corporate governance because previous research has shown that
KLD’s corporate governance category differs from all other categories and is not directly associ-
ated with CSR (Krüger 2015), leaving 12 indicators of strengths or concerns across six categories.
Although many studies have offered important insights by adding the 12 KLD indicators into
one overall CSR index (Borghesi, Houston, and Naranjo 2014; Ullmann 1985; Hull and Rothen-
berg 2008; Waddock and Graves 1997), information is lost when distinct and uncorrelated elements
are summed into a formative scale (Carroll, Primo, and Richter 2016). We thus use principal com-
ponent factor analysis to combine the 12 KLD factors to represent the same underlying latent
construct (Prakash, Ravi, and Zhao 2017). Principal components analysis identifies (PCA) factors
that maximize the explanatory power within a set of related variables. Although PCA is potentially
sensitive to the units in which the underlying variables are measured, measurement units are not
a concern here because the CSR ratings are simply the total number of concerns and strengths in
each of the indicator variables. However, the number of areas of strengths and concerns varies
from one category of CSR to another and, occasionally, from one year to another. Therefore, to
facilitate aggregation of information across the categories and, more importantly, to facilitate com-
parison across years, we standardize the ratings within each year by calculating z-scores. Using
eigenvalue one condition we find that exactly two principal components fit the criteria.
Based on PCA, we extract two complementary components that emerge for each firm-year
and from the twelve transformed variables. Appendix F describes the PCA factor loadings and
communalities across the CSR categories. These two components explain about 33% of all the
variability across the twelve categories. The first principal component quantifies the commonality
across the CSR strengths and CSR concerns (it loads positively on all strengths and concerns,
except diversity concerns). We label this the first component Symbolic CSR (Sym CSR), because
it may be interpreted to include those firm practices that address the current concerns caused by
a firm’s activities especially in response to some socially irresponsible behavior. In other words,
symbolic CSR strategies represent the immediate organizational responses to stakeholder concerns
after an incident of socially irresponsible behavior is publicly exposed. The second component
quantifies the contrasts across the CSR strengths and CSR concerns. It loads positively on all
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CSR concerns and negatively on all CSR strengths. We label the additive inverse of the second
component Substantive CSR (Sub CSR), because it may be interpreted to include a broad array
of CSR practices that are independent of current concerns in a firm while contributing to a firm’s
unique CSR strengths over time. In this context,substantive CSR is the inverse of the second
component from PCA.
2.3.3. Firm Performance and Firm Value
We use two measures of firm performance and firm value. We use return on assets (ROA), to
measure the accounting performance of the firm. Consistent with (Adams and Ferreira 2009;
Brockman, Rui, and Zou 2013), ROA is computed as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization to book value of assets. Following prior finance literature we use
Tobin’s Q to measure firm value. (Fang, Noe, and Tice 2009; Basu, Paeglis, and Rahnamaei 2016).
Tobin’s Q (TobinsQ) is computed as the ratio of market value of a firm to its book value. Market
value is calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value
of equity (See Appendix A for detailed description of variables used in the paper).
2.3.4. Control variables
We account for several board and firm characteristics that may impact the firm performance. We
use log of total assets as a measure of size of a firm (Ln Assets) and Leverage (Leverage), defined
as total debt of a firm divided by market value of equity to measure the value of debt. Firm
age (Firm Age) is the natural logarithm of firm age. Following (Ferreira and Laux 2007), we
estimate firm age from each firm’s first CRSP listing date. It accounts for the difference in life
cycle of a firm. Standard deviation of ROA (StDevROA) is a standard proxy for the riskiness
of investment decisions defined as the volatility of a firm’s operating return on assets. We also
control for Sales growth (Sales Growth), the average growth in sales volume for a firm, Tangibility
defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets and Capital expenditure (CapEx) scaled by total
assets. Board characteristics proxy for managerial discretion in decision making and impact firm
performance. We use log of total number of board directors to control for the size of the board
(board size). As research documents a positive relationship between corporate transparency and
independent directors (Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo 2011), we expect independent directors to
affect managerial decision-making process and control for fraction of independent directors (Pct
of ind dir). In addition, we also control for fraction of female directors (Pct of fem dir) as the
presence of two or more women on the board have been found to be positively related to firm
performance (Bennouri et al. 2018).
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Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on firm performance and firm value variables, CSR vari-
ables and other key CEO, board and firm characteristics. To minimize the impact of extreme
outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at top and bottom 1%. The gender indicator vari-
able (CEO Fem) has a mean of 0.0194 and the ethnicity indicator variable (CEO Non-white) has a
mean of 0.107. The findings show that for the sample period, female CEOs represent only 1.94%
of firm-year observations and non-white CEOs represent 10.7% of the firm-year observations. This
is consistent with (Bugeja, Matolcsy, and Spiropoulos 2012), as they find female CEOs to repre-
sent 1.97% for their sample of S&P 1500 firms for the period 1998-2010. The two CSR variables,
symbolic and substantive CSR have a mean of 0.721 and 0.056 respectively. The average ROA of
firms is 13.3% and the average Tobin’s Q is 1.896.
2.4. Results
2.4.1. Univariate Results
Table 2.3 provides the Univariate test results. It compares the firms headed by female CEOs to
those with male CEOs. It also compares the firms headed by non-white CEOs to those with white
CEOs. The mean difference in ROA between firms headed by women CEOs and male CEOs is
0.010, significant at 1% level. We also find firms headed by women CEOs to have a significantly
higher firm value and significantly higher investment in symbolic and substantive CSR. The mean
difference in ROA between firms headed by non-white CEOs and white CEOs is 0.006, significant
at 10% level. Non-white CEOs also tend to invest significantly higher in symbolic and substantive
CSR. The results are consistent with (McGuinness, Vieito, and Wang 2017), who find the presence
of female and foreign national directors to be associated with higher CSR investment. We also find
occupational minorities to occupy CEO positions of larger and younger firms relative to white-
male CEOs. Further, firms headed by occupational minority CEOs have bigger boards and a higher
percentage of independent and female directors.
2.4.2. Regression Analysis
In this section, we jointly test the effect of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance and firm
value in a multivariate setting by controlling for firm and board characteristics. The dependent
variables are firm performance (ROA) and firm value (Tobin’s Q). The main variables of interest
are gender indicator variable (CEO Fem) and ethnicity indicator variable (CEO non-white). We
start by running the following OLS model:
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ROA/Tobin′sQit = β0 +β1CEOFemit +β2CEONonwhiteit +∑β3ControlVariablesit + εit
(2.1)
SymCSR/SubCSRit = δ0 +δ1CEOFemit +δ2CEONonwhiteit +∑δ3ControlVariablesit + εit
(2.2)
We include Fama-French 12 industry, year and firm fixed effects to control for variations in
economic operations for our sample firms across years, firms and industries. We report test statis-
tics and significance levels based on standard errors clustered by firm and year levels (Petersen
2009).
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 presents the regression results from equation 2.1 and 2.2 respectively
which tests our hypotheses. Return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q are the dependent variables for
Table 2.4 and Symbolic (Sym CSR) and Substantive CSR (Sub CSR) are the dependent variables
for Table 2.5. In Table 2.4, column (1), the coefficient of CEO Fem is positive and significant
(0.021) at 1% level. We also find the coefficient of CEO Fem in column (4) to be positive and sig-
nificant (0.444) at 1% level. The finding supports our first hypothesis that firms headed by women
CEOs have higher firm performance and firm value. The difference in firm performance and firm
value could be because of the fundamental difference between genders in terms of risk-taking at-
titudes, leadership styles, incentive structures and ethical considerations (Marianne 2011; Güner,
Malmendier, and Tate 2008). However, it could also be attributed to differences in leadership
emergence between male and female CEOs. Consistent with glass ceiling hypothesis, the potential
existence of racial discrimination favors only the above-average women aspirants to reach the top.
Hence, gender discrimination may result in the superior performance of female CEOs in compar-
ison to their male counterparts. In columns (2) and (5), we control for ethnicity indicator variable
(CEO non-white). We find the coefficient of CEO non-white to be positive but insignificant, sug-
gesting that CEO ethnicity does not have a significant impact on firm performance and firm value.
This is consistent with (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003). Moreover, there is a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient on the interaction term (CEO Fem*non-white) shown in columns (3) and (6).
The results indicate that firms headed by women CEOs from ethnic minority backgrounds have
a higher tendency to perform better and have higher firm value. This is consistent with our first
hypothesis. We further find that larger and younger firms in their growth stage have a higher ROA
and Tobin’s Q, consistent with (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2016). Further firms with low lever-
age, high sales growth and a higher percentage of women CEOs are found to be associated with
better performance (Bugeja, Matolcsy, and Spiropoulos 2012). A higher board size is negatively
related to firm value (Adams and Ferreira 2009).
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Table 2.5 presents the results of the joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on corporate
social responsibility. The dependent variables are symbolic CSR (Sym CSR) and substantive CSR
(Sub CSR). In columns (1) and (4), the coefficient of CEO Fem is positive and significant at 1%
level. We also find the coefficient of CEO non-white in columns (2) and (5) to be positive and
significant at 1% level and 10% level respectively. The results provide evidence that firms headed
by occupational minority CEOs engage in higher CSR. This is consistent with our third and fourth
hypotheses. Investment in symbolic CSR can help managers to build their personal reputation
as good global citizens and attain job security (Barnea and Rubin 2010). CEOs belonging to
the occupational minority group have a higher perception of threat to their positions and need
to increase their job security. Hence they are more likely to invest in symbolic CSR. Consistent
with prior studies relating to board diversity and CSR, we find the presence of females and ethnic
minority directors is positively related to corporate philanthropy (Coffey and Wang 1998; Webb
2004; Williams 2003; Siciliano 1996). These studies indicate that women and minority directors
are more interested in the welfare of various stakeholders. We further find larger and old firms to
invest more in CSR. Firms with bigger boards and greater gender diversity also tend to engage in
higher CSR. The results are consistent with (Prakash, Ravi, and Zhao 2017).
Overall, our results are consistent with our hypotheses underlying that CEOs from occupational
minority groups perform better than their white male counterparts. We also find firms headed by
women and non-white CEOs to have higher firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. This is consistent
with glass ceiling hypothesis. The discrimination faced by women and ethnic minorities while
climbing the corporate hierarchical ladder acts as a filtration process and only the above-average
can achieve CEO positions. The above-average ability and qualifications of minority CEOs thus
result in better firm performance and firm value. Further, CEOs belonging to occupational minority
groups have a greater threat to their position (Cook and Glass 2014) and are more likely to invest
in CSR to build their personal reputation and enhance the welfare of the stakeholders.
2.4.3. Additional Model Specifications
Thus far, we have shown that CEO gender and ethnicity have a significant influence on firm per-
formance, firm value and CSR investments by firms. In this section we use an alternate model to
examine the impact of gender difference on firm performance, firm value and CSR. The analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) is a statistical procedure for looking at group effects on the outcome vari-
able controlling for continuous explanatory variables. Developed and popularized by Sir Ronald
Fisher (Fisher 1954), ANCOVA generates prediction equations for various levels of the categorical
variable of interest and is widely used in biological clinical experiments to evaluate the difference
in treatment effect between treated and non-treated groups. (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984; Miller
and Chapman 2001). Hence, in addition to the OLS model, we also run the ANCOVA model to
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compare the differences in firm performance and CSR practices by male and female CEOs mod-
erated by ethnicity. We generate a categorical variable (CEOGenEthn), which takes the value of
one if the CEO is female (CEO Fem=1) and is non-white (CEO non-white=1), two if the CEO is
female (CEO Fem=1) but is white (CEO non-white=0) and three if the CEO is male (CEO Fem=0)
and non-white (CEO non-white=1). The ANCOVA model is a conditional model that will test the
differences for each of the three groups of the categorical variable (CEOGenEthn) with the base
category, white male CEOs. The ANCOVA model is described as
ROA/Tobin′sQ = β0 +β1 Git +∑β2ControlVariables+ εit (2.3)
SymCSR/SubCSR = δ0 +δ1 Sit +∑δ2ControlVariables+ εit (2.4)
where Git captures the different categories of CEOGenEthn and coefficient captures the impact
of the difference in CEO gender and ethnicity on outcome variable. Specifically, it captures the
average change in outcome variable dependent on the difference in female and male CEOs and
white and non-white CEOs relative to the base category: white male CEOs.
Table 2.6 provides the results for the ANCOVA model. The coefficient of CEO non-white
female in column (1) is positive and significant (0.065) at 1% level. Further, the coefficient of
CEO white female and CEO non-white male is also positive but significant at 5% and 10% level
respectively. The result confirms that firms headed by occupational minority CEOs are more likely
to perform better than their white male counterparts. The difference in ROA for firms headed by
non-white female CEOs and white male CEOs is the highest, followed by white female CEOs
and non-white male CEOs. This is consistent with glass ceiling hypothesis. The average female
executive from ethnic minority backgrounds who makes it to the position of CEO has had to go
through relatively higher levels of scrutiny and accountability, vis-à-vis white female CEOs. The
higher discriminatory filters make it hardest for ethnic minority women to reach CEO positions
Those who reach the top are the best of the best amongst the group and hence perform the best.
Column (2) confirms that firms headed by occupational minority CEOs have higher firm value
relative to their male counterparts. The columns (3) and (4) affirms our hypotheses that CEOs
from occupational minority groups engage in higher symbolic and substantive CSR relative to
their white male counterparts.
2.5. Endogeneity Concerns
Our results suggest that firms headed by CEOs from occupational minority backgrounds have
better performance, higher firm value and greater CSR contributions. However, concerns in the
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prior literature suggest a self-selection bias in the CEO hiring process violating the randomization
assumption. Women leaders may choose to work in certain types of firms or certain boards could
be more inclined to hire women leaders (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Adams and Ferreira 2009).
Further, our results could be driven by omitted firm characteristics that affect CEO gender, firm
performance and CSR variables. In this section we adopt a propensity matched sample approach
and a difference-in-differences analysis with CEO turnovers to rule out any potential endogeneity
concerns.
2.5.1. Evidence from Matched Samples
To address biased estimation because of large gender disparity and ethnic disparity among CEO
firm-year observations and potential omitted variables concern, we analyze differences in firm
performance, firm value and CSR for each of the occupational minority subgroup CEOs and
white male CEOs using a propensity matched sample approach. Following (Huang and Kisgen
2013), firm years with white female CEOs, non-white female CEOs and non-white male CEOs are
matched with white male CEOs, based on observable firm, board and CEO characteristics. Specif-
ically, to employ propensity score matching, we start by running a logit model that regresses the
CEO gender and ethnicity variable (CEO non-white female, CEO white female, CEO non-white
male) on a set of characteristics including total assets (Ln (Assets)), Leverage (Leverage), sales
growth (sales Growth) and Board size (Board size), year and industry dummies. We then use
propensity score to perform a nearest neighbor match without replacement. We compare each of
the subgroups of occupational minority CEO firm-year observations with white-male CEO firm-
year observations to re-examine the joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance,
firm value and CSR investments.
Table 2.7 provides the results of the regressions on matched samples. Panel A of Table 2.7
reports the regression results of firm performance and firm value on each of the occupational mi-
nority subgroups relative to white-male CEOs. We consistently find that occupational minority
CEOs perform better than their white-male counterparts. The coefficient of CEO non-white fe-
male is positive and significant (0.084) significant at 1% level. The evidence based on matched
samples of non-white female CEOs and white-male CEOs in columns (1) and (4) shows that firms
headed by non-white female CEOs perform significantly better and have higher firm value relative
to white-male CEOs. In columns (2) and (5), the coefficient of CEO white female is also positive
and significant (0.019 and 0.231) at 5% level. Consistent with prior results we find firms headed by
white female CEOs have higher ROA and Tobin’s Q relative to firms headed by white male CEOs.
Comparing matched samples of non-white male CEOs and white male CEOs in columns (3) and
(6), we consistently find that firms headed by non-white CEOs have higher firm performance and
firm value relative to firms headed by white male CEOs.
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Overall, the results confirm the glass ceiling hypothesis. The superior performance of execu-
tives from occupational minority group indeed shows that superiority of one gender over the other
is not driving the results, but it is the result of discriminatory filters which permits only above aver-
age women and non-white male CEOs to reach these positions. Further, the average performance of
non-white female CEOs emerges out to be the best followed by white female CEOs and non-white
male CEOs. This shows that gender and race discriminatory practices have cumulative effects on
the leadership emergence process. The finding that white-female CEOs demonstrate marginally
superior performance relative to non-white male CEOs also suggests that gender discrimination is
more intense relative to racial discrimination.
Panel B of Table 2.7 provides the regression results of symbolic and substantive CSR on each
of the occupational minority subgroups relative to white-male CEOs. Consistently, we find occu-
pational minority CEOs to outperform white male CEOs in symbolic and substantive CSR invest-
ments. In columns (1), (2) and (3), we find the coefficient of CEO non-white female, CEO white
female and CEO non-white male to be positive and significant. This provides evidence that occupa-
tional minority CEOs initiate more symbolic CSR relative to their white male counterparts. (Ryan
and Haslam 2007) suggests that occupational minority CEOs have a higher threat of job security
as they are evaluated negatively. Hence, CEOs belonging to occupational minority groups initiate
higher symbolic CSR to build their personal reputation and enhance their job security. (Barnea and
Rubin 2010)
Panel B of Table 2.7 also provides evidence that occupational minority CEOs initiate higher
substantive CSR. The coefficient of CEO non-white female, CEO white female and CEO non-white
male is positive and significant confirming the higher initiation of substantive CSR by occupational
minority CEOs relative to white-male CEOs. Consistent with (Coffey and Wang 1998; Webb
2004) we find occupational minority CEOs are more interested in the long-term welfare of the
stakeholders.
2.5.2. Evidence from CEO turnovers
In addition to propensity score matching to address the endogenous concern, we examine CEO
turnovers and the associated changes in firm performance and CSR investments. This analysis
compares the differences in firm performance and CSR for the same firm due to changes in CEOs.
Therefore, if any trends followed by the firms prior to a change in CEO impact the results, this
difference-in-difference analysis using CEO turnovers should alleviate the bias.
We begin the analysis by running a logit regression to estimate the probability of hiring a
CEO from occupational minority groups. (Ryan and Haslam 2007; Cook and Glass 2013) find
that occupational minority CEOs are more likely to accept leadership positions in organizations
that are struggling, in crisis, or at risk of failing because, the occupational minority candidate
21
fears that he/she might not find a better offer. The dependent variable in the logit regression is
CEO-Min which takes the value of one if the CEO in firm-year observations is either a non-white
female, white female or a non-white male, zero otherwise3. The main variable of interest is the
change in firm performance prior to the transition to occupational minority CEOs. We calculate
average ROA two years before the transition as well as three years before the transition. We also
consider the change in ROA two years as well as three years prior to transition. We control for
firm and board characteristics. Table 2.8 provides the results of the logistic regression results.
The coefficient of Avg ROA and Alt Avg ROA is negative and significant at 5% level. Consistent
with (Ryan and Haslam 2007), we find there is a higher likelihood of struggling firms to hire
occupational minority CEOs. We further find larger firms with lower sales growth are more likely
to hire occupational minority CEOs. The result supports our second hypothesis suggesting that
CEOs from occupational minority groups are more likely to accept CEO positions at struggling
firms.
We then run the regression results for the CEO turnover sample to re-examine the impact tran-
sition to occupational minority CEOs have on firm performance, firm value and CSR investments.
Panel A of Table 2.9 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of executive turnovers. Our
CEO transitions sample contains 138 male-to-female transitions, 70 female-to-male transitions,
649 white to non-white transitions and 328 non-white to white transitions for the sample period
1998-2013. We find when firms transition to occupational minority CEOs, they experience a pos-
itive and significant increase in firm performance, firm value and CSR investments. The increase
in firm performance and firm value is largest when the incoming CEO is a female. However, when
the incoming CEO is a white-male, we find the coefficient to be negative but insignificant. This
again shows that firms headed by occupational minority CEOs perform better, have higher firm
value and initiate higher CSR relative to white male CEOs.
Panel B and Panel C of Table 2.9 provides the regression results for the CEO turnover sample.
We calculate the change in firm performance (change in ROA) as the difference between ROA two
years after transition (t+2) and one year prior to transition (t-1), where t is the year of CEO transi-
tion. We also calculate the change in firm value (change in Tobin’s Q) and change in CSR as the
difference between these variables two years after transition (t+2) and one year before transition
(t-1). In Panel B of Table 2.9, we find the coefficient on Male-to-female is positive and significant
at 1% level. This suggests that firms experience a significant increase in firm performance and firm
value post-transition to female CEOs. Firms also experience a significant increase in firm perfor-
mance and firm value following a white to non-white CEO transition. However, the coefficient on
female-to male and non-white to white is negative and insignificant, which provides evidence for a
decline in firm performance and value post-transition to a white-male CEO. Panel C of Table 2.9
3CEO Min represents Occupational Minority CEOs, adapted from (Taylor 2010)
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consistently finds that firms transitioning to CEOs from occupational minority groups initiate more
symbolic and substantive CSR. However, the coefficient of female-to-male and non-white to white
is negative but insignificant. The results consistently show that CEO gender and ethnicity impacts
CSR investments.
Overall, the results are consistent with glass ceiling hypothesis. The superior performance after
transitioning to occupational minority CEOs shows that discriminatory filters which permit only
above average women and non-white male CEOs to reach these positions resulting in better deci-
sion making. This is reflected in better firm performance, firm value and higher CSR investments.
2.6. Conclusion
Extant research in business research finds the presence of female gender in the C-suit seems to
impact the corporation’s performance and functioning in a positive and desirable manner. For
example, (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2016) found that firms run by female CEOs have lower
leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms run
by male CEOs. (Huang and Kisgen 2013) document that the propensity to make acquisitions is
lower in companies with female CFOs. They attribute these results to lower risk-taking tendency
of the female leadership. While this is definitely possible, we propose an alternate hypothesis.
The existence of Glass-ceiling in organizational hierarchies potentially subjects women candidates
to high levels of discrimination, vis-a-vis their male counterparts. This potentially prevents a
disproportionately large number of female candidates from making it to the top. Those who do
make it are of potentially of higher caliber than their average male counterparts in that position.
Being of superior performance, these women demonstrate on average superior leadership abilities.
Therefore, arguably, the glass-ceiling manifests in the form of superior performance of the average
women in position of leadership.
An obvious implication of our glass-ceiling hypothesis is that, we should see similar perfor-
mance and attributes among all occupational minorities who are subjected to the glass ceiling type
discrimination. Our results do show that if we divide the sample of CEOs by gender (male vs.
female) and ethnicity (white vs. non-white), we find that the average non-white female CEOs (two
levels of discrimination: gender and ethnicity) are among the best performers while the average
white-male CEO (no glass ceiling discrimination) is among the worst performer. We find that the
white female CEOs (gender discrimination) demonstrate marginally superior performance vis-a-
vis the average non-white male CEO (ethnic discrimination). A possible explanation for this could
be that the gender based discrimination is potentially severer than the ethnic discrimination.
We believe that this study contributes positively to the discussion on gender and equality in
workplace in at least two ways. First: it highlights the problem of discrimination against occu-
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pational minorities rather than just gender. To the extent that all discriminations are morally and
ethically wrong, recognizing the full scope of the problem is important. As our results show, over
the last decade, the proportion of women in corporate leadership has increased. However, almost
all the increase seems to be coming from simultaneous decrease in the proportion of non-white
men CEOs. This is one diversity replacing another. The problem of workplace discrimination
against occupational minorities seems to have only changed in nature not necessarily in severity.
Second: Psychology research seems to suggest that once the social stereotypes and expectations
are removed from the equation, the male and the female gender tend to be more alike than different.
However when the bulk of the research is attempting to find differences between the genders, this
can potentially orient society and organizations towards finding differences while downplaying the
similarities. If so, they can be sometimes used to support prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory
actions against one-group vs another.
A rather ominous prediction by (Schein 1973), “The strongly held attitude of "think manager-
think male" among decision makers who are men will keep women confined to middle-level
jobs.”(Ryan, Haslam, et al. 2011) looked into CEO transition in time of crisis (firm performance
declining). They found that men CEOs are more likely to turn down appointments in firms facing
crisis. However, women CEOs are less likely to turn down the offer due to the fear of forgoing
potentially the chance of a lifetime. A play on (Schein 1973), they coined the phrase “Think Cri-
sis–Think Female”. In this study, we have shown that behavior is not limited only to women CEOs.
The same is witnessed of any occupational minority candidate. Thus, we hope this study will help
tilt the above narrative to “Think Crisis–Think occupational minority”. By doing so, we hope that
the ongoing debate in business research which has focused almost entirely around gender will open
up to include more discussion around “glass-ceiling” and discrimination.
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Table 2.1: Frequency Distribution of CEOs categorized by gender and ethnicity
The Table provides frequency distribution of sample CEOs. Panel A provides the frequency distribution of CEOs based on gender and eth-
nicity for the entire sample and excluding interim CEOs. Panel B provides the distribution of female and non-white led CEOs by industry














Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
1998 340 89.13 1.75 8.82 0.29 335 89.12 1.77 8.82 0.29
1999 395 89.12 1.78 8.35 0.75 391 89.25 1.77 8.21 0.76
2000 344 88.38 1.45 9.30 0.87 339 88.70 1.44 8.98 0.88
2001 590 87.64 1.36 10.16 0.84 582 87.89 1.38 9.88 0.85
2002 553 87.53 1.81 9.76 0.90 546 87.88 1.82 9.39 0.91
2003 914 88.19 1.85 8.97 0.99 907 88.33 1.88 8.77 1.01
2004 923 88.09 1.95 8.77 1.19 906 88.14 1.99 8.65 1.22
2005 794 88.29 2.91 7.55 1.25 783 88.32 2.93 7.47 1.28
2006 779 87.82 3.21 7.31 1.66 770 87.90 3.20 7.20 1.69
2007 592 89.09 2.13 6.08 2.70 584 88.84 2.16 6.24 2.76
2008 793 87.93 2.50 7.18 2.39 782 88.01 2.45 7.13 2.40
2009 845 87.34 1.78 8.40 2.48 836 87.51 1.74 8.29 2.46
2010 853 88.53 1.29 6.79 3.39 843 88.69 1.24 6.70 3.37
2011 963 86.72 2.29 7.26 3.63 950 86.70 2.30 7.21 3.78
2012 968 87.10 2.89 6.50 3.51 961 86.99 2.92 6.53 3.56
2013 959 86.88 2.50 6.56 3.51 951
Total 11,605 11,466
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Panel B: frequency Distribution of Firms, Female and Non-white CEOs by Industry
Industry (2 digit SIC)
# of Firm-year
observations
% of Female CEOs % of Non-white CEOs
Consumer Non-Durables 869 2.18 1.95
Consumer Durables 407 0.73 0.75
Manufacturing 2234 1.45 1.27
Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction
and Products
545 1.46 1.83




Wholesale and Retail services 1568 3.25 1.51
Healthcare 920 2.06 1.52
Utilities 787 1.77 1.65
Others 1595 1.56 0.81
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Table 2.2: Sample Summary Statistics
The Table provides sample statistics for CEO gender, ethnicity and other firm and board charac-
teristics. CEO Fem is CEO gender indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if CEO is a fe-
male, 0 otherwise. CEO non-white is a CEO ethnicity indicator that takes the value of 1 if CEO
is non-white, 0 otherwise. ROA and Tobin’s Q are measures of firm performance and firm value.
Corporate social responsibility is captured by symbolic (Sym CSR) and substantive CSR (Sub CSR).
Variables No of obs Mean Median St Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
Main Variables of Interest
CEO Fem 11,605 0.0194 0 0.086 0 0
CEO Non-white 11,605 0.107 0 0.309 0 0
ROA 11,466 0.133 0.126 0.097 0.080 0.179
Tobin’s Q 11,541 1.896 1.496 1.241 1.157 2.149
Sym CSR 10,740 0.721 0.065 2.318 -0.909 1.462
Sub CSR 10,740 0.056 0.046 1.387 -0.673 0.625
Firm Characteristics
Ln Assets 11,605 8.440 8.319 1.576 7.294 9.448
Leverage 11,605 0.227 0.175 0.206 0.058 0.350
Ln (Firm Age) 11,099 2.522 2.639 0.515 2.302 2.890
Sales Growth 9,722 1.083 1.066 0.266 0.989 1.149
StDev ROA 10,881 0.039 0.028 0.040 0.0168 0.047
CapEx 10,877 0.071 0.034 0.146 0.018 0.067
Board Characteristics
Board Size 11,466 5.783 8.00 0.768 4.00 10.00
Pct of Ind Dir 11,466 0.727 0.777 0.236 0.625 0.887
Pct of Fem Dir 11,466 0.104 0.090 0.135 0 0.166
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Table 2.3: Univariate Analysis
The Table shows comparison of means of firm-level and board-level characteristics for for firm CEOs differentiated by gender and eth-
nicity.Panel A compares the means of firm performance, CSR and other firm and board level characteristics for firm-years headed by
women CEOs to firm-years headed by male CEOs. Panel B compares the mean of firm performance, CSR and other firm and board
level characteristics for firm-years headed by non-white CEOs to firm-years headed by white CEOs.Difference in means and their sta-
tistical significance is based on a t-test.The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.













ROA 0.143 0.133 0.010*** 0.134 0.128 0.006*
Tobin’s Q 2.173 1.892 0.281*** 1.899 1.883 0.015*
Sym CSR 1.352 0.720 0.631*** 1.363 0.653 0.709***
Sub CSR 0.176 0.055 0.120** 0.319 0.025 0.294***
Ln Assets 8.795 8.439 0.365*** 8.804 8.401 0.402***
Leverage 0.217 0.227 -0.009 0.238 0.225 0.013**
Ln (Firm Age) 2.434 2.522 -0.088 2.490 2.525 -0.034
Sales Growth 1.085 1.082 0.002 1.087 1.082 0.005
StDev ROA 0.038 0.028 0.010* 0.0038 0.0039 -0.007
CapEx 0.068 0.071 -0.004* 0.059 0.073 -0.013***
Board Size 6.328 5.777 0.55** 6.141 5.748 0.392***
Pct of Ind Dir 0.777 0.727 0.050*** 0.774 0.722 0.051***
Pct of Fem Dir 0.272 0.103 0.169*** 0.129 0.103 0.025***
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Table 2.4: Impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on Firm Performance and Firm Value: OLS
Regression
We report panel data regression results on the joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm per-
formance and firm value. ROA is the dependent variable for columns (1),(2) and (3) and Tobin’s Q is
the dependent variable for columns (4),(5) and (6). The main variables of interest are CEO Fem, CEO
non-white and the interaction of CEO Fem and CEO non-white. We control for year, firm and industry
fixed effects. The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var ROA Tobin’s Q


























































































































































No of obs 11,466 11,466 11,466 11,466 11,466 11,466
R-Squared 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.34 0.35 0.38
Firm/year/industry
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.5: Impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on symbolic and substantive CSR: OLS
Regression
We report panel data regression results on the joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on CSR initia-
tions.Symbolic CSR (Sym CSR) is the dependent variable for columns (1),(2) and (3) and Substantive CSR
(Sub CSR) is the dependent variable for columns (4),(5) and (6). The main variables of interest are CEO Fem,
CEO non-white and the interaction of CEO Fem and CEO non-white. We control for year, firm and industry
fixed effects. The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var Sym CSR Sub CSR


























































































































































No of obs 10,740 10,740 10,740 10,740 10,740 10,740
R-Squared 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.26 0.35
Firm/year/industry
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.6: Impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance, firm value and CSR:
ANCOVA Regression
The Table reports panel data regression results on the joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on CSR ini-
tiations.Symbolic CSR (Sym CSR)is the dependent variable for columns (1),(2) and (3) and Substantive CSR
(Sub CSR) is the dependent variable for columns (4), (5) and (6).The main variables of interest are CEO Fem,
CEO non-white and the interaction of CEO Fem and CEO non-white. We control for year, firm and industry































































































































No of obs 11,466 11,466 10,740 10,740
R-Squared 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.12
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Table 2.7: Joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance, firm value and
CSR: Evidence from Matched Samples
The Table reports the estimation of the impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance and CSR
using a propensity matched sample approach. Panel A of the Table provides regression results for the impact
of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance and firm value while Panel B reports the impact of CEO
gender and ethnicity on symbolic and substantive CSR. The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance and firm value
Dep Var ROA Tobin’s Q


















































































































































No of obs 120 246 1,368 120 246 1,368
R-Squared 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
32
Panel B: Joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on symbolic and substantive CSR
Dep Var Sym CSR Sub CSR


















































































































































No of obs 116 232 1,352 116 232 1,352
R-Squared 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.11
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.8: Logistic regression results of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance
The Table reports the logistic regression results to test the likelihood of occupational minori-
ties to occupy CEO positions.The dependent variable is average ROA computed as the aver-
age ROA two years and three years prior to CEO transition to occupational minority CEO.
For robustness, we also use two-year and three-year change in ROA as the dependent vari-
able. We control for firm-level and board-level characteristics.We also report the likelihood ra-






















































































No of obs 7,832 7,832 7,641 7,635
Likelihood Ratio 24.06*** 23.43*** 22.74*** 23.62***
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Table 2.9: Joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on firm performance, firm value and
CSR: Evidence from CEO turnovers
Panel A the Table reports descriptive statistics for CEO turnover sample over the sample period. We iden-
tify Male-to-Female, Female-to-Male, White-to-Non-white and Non-white-to-White CEO transitions and
report one-year change in firm performance, firm value and CSR post CEO transitions. Panel B reports the
regression results for impact of CEO transitions on change in firm performance and firm value. Change
in firm performance and Change in firm value is calculated as difference in ROA and Tobin’s Q one year
after transition (t+2) and one year prior to transition (t-1). Panel C reports the regression results for im-
pact on CEO transitions on change in symbolic and substantive CSR. Change in symbolic and substan-
tive CSR is calculated as the difference in CSR two years post transition (t+2) and one year prior to tran-
sition (t-1).The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics









Male-to-Female (M-F) 138 0.028*** 0.397** 0.408* 0.222**
Female-to-Male (F-M) 70 -0.007 -0.397 -0.518** -0.039*
White-to-Non-white (W-NW) 649 0.013* 0.251* 0.149* 0.100**
Non-white-to-White (NW-W) 328 0.005 -0.101 -0.109* -0.050*
Panel B: Joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on change in firm performance and firm value:
Regression Analysis










































Firm level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Board Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12
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Panel C: Joint impact of CEO gender and ethnicity on symbolic and substantive CSR: Regression
Analysis










































Firm level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Board Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10
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Chapter 3
Obstacles beyond Glass Ceiling: The impact
of female leadership on Earnings
Management
3.1. Introduction
An increasing number of women have successfully shackled the glass ceiling by reaching the up-
per echelons of the corporate sectors. With increased attention towards gender diversity in C-suits,
several studies examine the potential barriers women face on their way to the top as well as the role
of women in shaping corporate outcomes. (Cook and Glass 2013; Adams and Ferreira 2009; Kim
and Starks 2016). Recently, scholarly attention has also shifted towards understanding the poten-
tial barriers women face after attaining senior corporate roles. Theoretical studies find that women
leaders face significant constraints post-promotion to key leadership positions (Bowles 2012; Glass
and Cook 2016). This form of discrimination is called ‘glass cliff’, whereby women are assigned
to leadership positions riskier than men, experience heightened scrutiny and exaggerated stereo-
types (Ryan and Haslam 2005; Ryan and Haslam 2007; Bruckmüller et al. 2014). The challenges
women face after occupying top executive positions shape their leadership styles, attitudes and
decision-making process. Whether gender differences in leadership emergence due to glass cliff
impacts corporate outcomes is a fundamental question not yet answered in the finance literature.
The question is particularly important considering the emerging worldwide trend towards gender
equality. In this paper we advance the current finance research by examining the impact managerial
power has on the relation between CEO gender and financial reporting quality.
A growing body of finance research concurs that female directors and managers have a signif-
icant impact on corporate decision making (Levi, Li, and Zhang 2014; Huang and Kisgen 2013;
Francis et al. 2015). However, the literature does not show a clear consensus on whether women
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at leadership positions benefit or detriment reporting quality. Prior Empirical evidence shows that
female executives are more diligent monitors than their male counterparts enhancing financial re-
porting quality (Betz, O’Connell, and Shepard 1989; Gul, Fung, and Jaggi 2009; Krishnan and
Parsons 2008). The Presence of women on corporate boards is also associated with reduced cor-
porate scandals and frauds(Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011; Cumming, Leung, and Rui 2015). In
addition, women executives are found to be more cautious which helps improve the overall quality
of board decisions (Luo, Xiang, and Huang 2017). The rationale offered for the above evidence
is that women are fundamentally more ethical and risk averse than their male counterparts (Barua
et al. 2010; Watson and McNaughton 2007).
In contrast, (Lakhal et al. 2015), using a sample of French-listed firms document that female
CEOs and CFOs do not reduce earnings management in firms. A few studies suggest no evi-
dence of CEO gender influences on earnings management (Ye, Zhang, and Rezaee 2010; Yu et al.
2010). In addition, (Harris, Karl, and Lawrence 2019) finds CEO gender differences in earning
management behavior to vanish at high levels of equity-based compensation. This evidence is
supported by a growing body of psychology and management literature that implies no manifes-
tation of gender-based differences in ethical standards and risk-taking behaviors within corporate
boardrooms (Hyde 2005; Cook and Glass 2013). (Adams and Ferreira 2009) finds that women
who pursue leadership positions are rather like men to ensure survival in the predominantly male
environment. The research further finds women executives to be more risk loving than their male
counterparts.
Based on the above arguments, our paper aims to examine two key research questions. Firstly,
we examine the impact of CEO gender on earnings management. Although previous studies have
examined the effect of gender diverse boards on earnings management, the impact of CEO gender
on earnings management is still debatable given the mixed evidence in the literature. Secondly,
previous empirical studies mainly provide evidence on gender differences in ethical standards and
risk aversion in shaping earnings management behavior of women CEOs. But to our knowledge,
ours is the first study to consider discrimination and glass cliffs that women CEOs face, which
might impact their earnings management behaviors.
Role congruity theory (Eagly and Karau 2002) suggests that individuals are judged with re-
spect to the congruence between their characteristics dictated by their gender stereotypes and the
requirements of the job that they occupy. Women CEOs engaging in earnings management cre-
ates incongruity between feminine stereotypes and masculine qualities of a leader. This leads to
negative expectations and evaluations about the performance of women CEOs (Eagly and Johnson
1990; Eagly and Karau 2002; Powell, Butterfield, and Bartol 2008). To test the glass cliff hypoth-
esis and role congruity theory, we examine if CEO power distorts the CEO gender and earnings
management relationship. Prior studies document the success of CEOs in manipulating perfor-
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mance critically depends on their power to influence decisions (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988;
Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2005). Powerful CEOs are found to pressurize CFOs to report bi-
ased earnings performance (Friedman 2014; Feng et al. 2011). Further, powerful CEOs are subject
to weaker board monitoring, reduced scrutiny and a higher incentive to withhold information from
the shareholders (Fracassi and Tate 2012). Given that power can act as a stimulus that can shift
managers’ focus, we hypothesize that CEO gender and earnings management relationship distorts
with increased CEO power. That is, in a powerful CEO setting, women CEOs are subject to less
scrutiny and have an opportunity to influence the decision-making process.
To empirically answer our research questions, we employ a panel of over 1400 listed firms
for the period 2000-2016. We collect demographic information on CEOs using ISS database and
generate an indicator variable CEO Fem which takes the value of one if the CEO is a female, zero
otherwise. Following prior literature, we use CEO duality and CEO pay slice to capture CEO
power (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011; Grinstein and Hribar 2004). Further, we use real
activities manipulations and absolute value of discretionary accruals as proxies of earnings man-
agement (Roychowdhury 2006; Jones 1991). We find that magnitude of earnings management is
significantly lower for firms headed by women CEOs. We then jointly test the effect of CEO gen-
der and power on earnings management. The results show that as the power with CEOs increases,
no significant relation between CEO gender and earnings management exists. The impact of CEO
power is economically important as the coefficient estimate for earnings management in the base-
line model suggests the presence of women CEOs to be associated with a 0.448 percentage point
decline in earnings management, but for powerful women CEOs, the coefficient estimate shows a
0.317 percentage point increase in earnings management. We further partition the sample based on
CEO duality and find women CEOs to engage in less earnings management only in the absence of
power. For the sub-sample of powerful CEOs, no significant difference in earnings management is
found between male and female CEOs. This is consistent with the glass cliff hypothesis and role
congruity theory whereby power in the hands of women executives gives them the opportunity to
overcome the “second wave” of gender discrimination after glass ceiling and exert influence over
the management decisions (Ryan and Haslam 2007).
Consistent with prior gender studies, our study faces the challenges of small female CEO sam-
ple size, selection bias and omitted variable concerns (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Adams and Ferreira
2009; Adhikari 2012). In order to address these endogeneity concerns, we rely on methodological
techniques accepted in the literature, including propensity score matching, instrumental variable
approach and difference-in-difference analysis. Our results are robust to these techniques and
support our hypotheses. Our difference-in-difference analysis using CEO turnovers shows that a
male-to-female CEO transition results in a significant decline in earnings management only if the
incoming women CEO holds low managerial power. Considered in entirety, our results suggest
39
that glass cliffs and role incongruities play an important role in shaping the earnings management
behavior of women CEOs.
Our study has important practical implications. Its main contribution is to the literature on
CEO gender diversity as we provide additional evidence of how behavioral aspects of women
CEOs can affect corporate policies. Prior studies document that increased gender diversity in
corporate boardrooms is associated with positive corporate outcomes. One of the key elements
of this relation is fundamental differences in genders. However, our study identifies a previously
unexplored factor, glass cliff, as an important factor dictating earnings management behavior of
women CEOs. Secondly, we add to the growing line of research studying the impact of managerial
characteristics on corporate outcomes. Our study extends the recent literature that examines the
role of CEO traits influencing corporate investments and financial policies (Malmendier and Tate
2005; Frye and Pham 2018; Jiang, Zhu, and Huang 2013). Thirdly, our study is also related to the
literature examining the economic consequences of managerial power on various firm outcomes.
Consistent with (Fracassi and Tate 2012), we find powerful CEOs are subject to weaker board
monitoring, can influence decisions and exert pressure to report biased performance measures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relevant literature and
develop testable hypotheses in Section 2 and 3. Section 4 discusses the data, sample collection and
the methodology used while Section 5 sets out the results. Section 6 presents the additional model
specifications following by concluding remarks.
3.2. Theory, Literature and Hypothesis Development
3.2.1. Earnings Management Overview
Earnings management refers to the distortion of reported firm financial performance and is one
of the salient self-serving behaviors. A large body of literature suggests that to pursue short term
objectives, managers manipulate earnings that have a detrimental impact on shareholder wealth
(Farooqi, Harris, and Ngo 2014; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). According to the long
established stream of finance literature, agency conflict between managers and shareholders lead
managers to extract private benefits at the cost of shareholder wealth. These managers, to keep
their jobs, even if are no longer competent, inflate earnings to avoid their dismissal under poor
performance. Consequently, such managerial self-serving behaviors mislead shareholders’ about
corporate performance and its outcomes (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon
2006). Extant literature documents the existence of earnings management to meet and beat short
term targets and avoid documenting earning declines and losses (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser
1999; Brown and Higgins 2001; Burgstahler and Eames 2003; Daske, Gebhardt, and McLeay
2006; Myers, Myers, and Skinner 2007).
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Many studies demonstrate that earnings management can be of two types, the opportunistic
use of accruals to inflate earnings and real activities manipulation to increase current earnings
(Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Accrual based earnings management obscures the true
financial performance by changing the accounting methods or estimates and have become easy to
detect considering tighter regulations and accounting regimes (Jones 1991; Dechow and Dichev
2002). Real earnings management, on the other hand alters the execution of real business transi-
tions. As the manipulation of real transactions (discretionary expenses and production costs) are
harder to detect, more and more managers have a greater willingness to resort to real earnings
management (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008). (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal
2005) report 78% of the managers surveyed use real activities to manipulate earnings while only
7.9% state using accrual-based earnings management.
3.2.2. Behavioral biases beyond Glass Ceiling: Role Congruity Theory
Glass ceiling, concrete walls, sticky floors and career labyrinths are often used as metaphors to
describe transparent barriers that prevent women from moving up the corporate ladder beyond a
certain point (Morrison et al. 1987). While most of the academic research investigates the mech-
anisms by which gender diversity in boardroom adds corporate value, a relatively small body of
work seeks to examine the challenges female leaders experience post-promotion to key executive
roles. With reference to women leaders, role congruity theory finds that prejudice occurs based on
incongruity between the leader roles and the female gender roles. (Eagly and Karau 2002; Heil-
man 2001). The incongruity presents challenges for female leaders in two forms. First, women
are evaluated less favorable than men as potential leaders because leadership qualities are consid-
ered stereotypical of men (Schein 1973; Koenig et al. 2011; Gorman 2005). Corporate leadership
positions are stereotyped as masculine work and opposed to women, cultural schemas associate
only men to successfully fulfill leadership roles (Britton 2001; Schein 2001). Second, leadership
behavior enacted by women is evaluated less favorably than equivalent behavior in men because it
is perceived as a less desirable trait in women (Eagly and Karau 2002; Schock et al. 2019). These
biases lead to negative evaluations for female leaders irrespective of their ability, qualifications and
performance (Eagly 2007; Eagly and Karau 2002). Further, the animosity towards female leaders
leads to excessive scrutiny of their performance (Kanter 1977). For instance, (Davies-Netzley
1998) finds that female leaders perceive themselves as “outsiders on the inside” and are under
constant scrutiny to outperform their male peers. Women leaders are negatively evaluated for be-
ing voluble when in power, while men are appreciated for the same when in leadership positions
(Brescoll et al. 2012). Shareholders reaction to the announcement of women CEO is significantly
more negative to the announcement of male CEO appointment (Lee and James 2007). Indeed,
unlike men, women face a threat of negative evaluations if they engage in authoritarian behav-
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ior despite needed for effective leadership (Rudman 1998; Livingston, Rosette, and Washington
2012). In the corporate setting, role incongruity may create resistance for women CEOs in the
form of intense board monitoring and increased board scrutiny (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998;
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter 2012).
3.2.2.1. CEO Gender and Earnings Management
There has been increased pressure around the globe towards gender equality in C-suites (Ahern
and Dittmar 2012). The issue of correctly reporting financial numbers is a monetary and ethical
dilemma and the existing literature finds female representation in boards as an important factor. Re-
cent finance literature finds gender-based ethical decision making has a positive impact on financial
reporting. (Cumming, Leung, and Rui 2015) find that the presence of women on boards reduces
corporate misconduct. Similarly, (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011; Francis et al. 2015) find women rep-
resentation in management teams improves the firm’s accounting policies. However, despite some
prior literature documenting a positive association between gender diversity and various corporate
outcomes, differences in gender characteristics at top leadership positions and otherwise lacks a
theoretical framework in psychology as well as management literature. (Hyde 2005) did a meta-
analysis of 46 studies and found few psychological differences between genders. Further, gender
differences can and do emerge in varying conditions, but can be reversed with a change in circum-
stances or environment. Similar results were found in studies on gender differences in aggression,
helping behaviors, conversation interruption as well as athletic performance (Lightdale and Pren-
tice 1994; Eagly and Crowley 1986; Anderson and Leaper 1998; Hively and El-Alayli 2014). The
management literature studying female leadership finds no significant gender differences at top
executive levels. For instance, (Adams and Funk 2012) find female leaders to be slightly more risk
loving than their male peers. Further, they are less traditional and security-oriented relative to their
male counterparts.
Considered in entirety, the impact of women in C-suites and leadership positions on various
financial outcomes is still an ongoing debate including the impact on earnings management. On
one hand, (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011) find female directors to reduce earnings management.
Earnings quality is also found to be positively associated with female representation on board as
women executives are found to follow more conservative financial reporting strategies (Krishnan
and Parsons 2008). (Na and J. Hong 2017) find male CEOs to aggressively use discretionary accru-
als and real earnings manipulation to inflate current earnings, while female CEOs do not. On the
other hand, (Lakhal et al. 2015) find female CEOs and CFOs do not affect earnings management.
(Yu et al. 2010; Barua et al. 2010) report that female CFOs are associated with lower earnings man-
agement, but not female CEOs. Some studies further find no association of gender with earnings
management (Ye, Zhang, and Rezaee 2010).
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3.3. Hypothesis Development
As aforementioned, prior studies fail to take into consideration the challenges women leaders face
post promotion to key executive roles, which impact their behavior and attitude towards earnings
management. This oversight can help explain the conflicting results in the prior literature. With
psychology and management literature attesting lack of significant difference between genders and
based on the role congruity theory, unlike men, female leaders face intense scrutiny from insiders
and stakeholders and are less likely to engage in earnings management. Importantly, not only
because women leaders are perceived as less capable and qualified, but because it is not in line with
their ‘expected’ gender roles. Women are expected to exhibit communion attributions associated
with cooperation, welfare, honesty and sustainability (Bakan 1966; Wood and Eagly 2012; Eagly,
Wood, and Diekman 2000). In other words, if women resort to earnings management, they will
be viewed as less competent and capable to perform and also evaluated negatively as they fail to
conform to their gender roles. As a result, decision makers will replace them for male leaders
perceived to be more competent and capable. We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Firms headed by Female CEOs engage in less earnings management than firms
headed by Male CEOs.
3.3.1. The moderating role of CEO power
The upper echelons literature has emphasized the role of CEOs in the firm strategy and decision-
making process with mixed arguments pertaining to positive and negative repercussions of CEO
power (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Sturm and Antonakis 2015). Being an architect of the firm’s
overall strategy, a powerful CEO can exert significant influence on the board and the decision-
making process detrimental to firm performance. Extant literature suggests CEO power to nega-
tively impact profitability and shareholder wealth (Daily and Johnson 1997). Based on an agency
cost perspective, (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2005) find that the powerful CEOs exert their
will and influence financial reporting significantly more than less powerful CEOs. Powerful CEOs
are also found to exert greater pressure on CFOs to involve in material accounting manipulations
(Feng et al. 2011). Consistent with this notion, several studies report that greater CEO power
leads to lower quality of earnings (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira 2005; Efendi, Srivastava, and
Swanson 2007). Managerial Power theory (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 2002; Bebchuk and Fried
2004; Ntim et al. 2019) contends that powerful CEOs exert their power over the board in the com-
pensation setting process, which allows them to extract rents from the firm. Powerful CEOs are
also found to have higher compensation and higher bonuses for mergers and acquisitions (Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Grinstein and Hribar 2004).
Therefore, while female CEOs may be less inclined towards earnings management, increased
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CEO power is likely to have a mitigating effect on the relation. Increased CEO power can lead
to reduced scrutiny and increased influence over decision making. Specifically, in the absence
of power, CEO’s ability to effective leadership may be hampered, especially if there is a conflict
between the board and top management. On the other hand, increased CEO power provides a
platform to align the firm’s strategic vision with the board (Alexander, Fennell, and Halpern 1993;
Anderson and Anthony 1986). Further, CEOs can influence the tone of earnings management by
the appointment of CFO and other board members who share their preferences (Bishop, DeZoort,
and Hermanson 2017; Carcello et al. 2011). This allows CEOs to exert pressure on reporting
judgments and decisions. Previous studies provide evidence of increased earnings management as
well as managers’ preferences for reporting qualitative financial reporting with higher CEO stock-
based compensation (Burns and Kedia 2006; Yermack 1997). Extending this line of research,
higher CEO power is likely to induce a stronger incentive to portray an overly optimistic picture of
the firm’s earnings. In other words, CEO power will lead to reduced scrutiny and more decision-
making capability for women CEOs. Hence, we theorize that while female CEOs engage in less
earnings management than male CEOs, gender differences in earnings management to decline with
increased CEO power. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Firms led by powerful Female CEOs exhibit similar earnings management as
firms headed by powerful Male CEOs.
3.4. Data and Variable Construction
3.4.1. Data and sample selection
We begin constructing our sample using Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) directors and Ex-
ecuComp database, which provides time series data for top executives in S&P 1500 firms. We
define CEO in a given year as a person identified as CEO by the ISS database (Employment title-
CEO), collect the name and gender of all CEOs, (Female and Director-Full Name) and board level
variables from years 2000 to 2016. We refine the sample by eliminating firms in the financial
services (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities industry (SIC 4900-4999) because of their regulatory re-
quirements. We collect executive salaries and ownership using ExecuComp database. We obtain
accounting data from Compustat to construct earnings management and control variables. (See
Appendix B for definition of all variables used in the study). Our final sample contains 11,207
firm-year observations from 2000-2016, including 496 female CEOs firm-year observations. For
each firm-year observation, we create an indicator variable CEO Fem that equals one if the firm is
headed by a woman, and zero otherwise.
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3.4.2. CEO Power
Prior studies have used a wide variety of measures for executive power (Adams, Almeida, and
Ferreira 2005; Hill and Phan 1991). We use the two most relevant and comprehensive variables
based on the construct of duality and centrality (Grinstein and Hribar 2004). For CEOs, duality
is determined by whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Duality captures the CEO’s
ability to influence policy and decision making by having formal authority over the board and
management. (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011) points out that CEO pay slice (CPS) is useful
to measure the centrality of the CEO in the top management team. Centrality measures the relative
importance (ability, contribution and power) of the CEO. Unlike other objective measures, CPS
captures the dimensions of CEO’s role beyond merely holding the position of chair. Also, because
CPS is based on compensation information of executives in the same firms, it controls for any firm
specific characteristics that affect the average level of power held by the CEO (Liu and Jiraporn
2010). Hence, for robustness, we followed (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011) and use CEO
pay slice as the second measure of CEO power. CEO pay slice (CPS) calculated as “the ratio
of CEO total compensation (salary, bonus and equity-based, reported as tdc1 in ExecuComp) to
the combined total compensation of top five executives (including CEO) in a firm”, represents the
relative value assigned to the CEO by the board and the power of the CEO within the management
team. (Choe, Tian, and Yin 2014; Baker et al. 2019).
We report the distribution of female CEO led firms and CEO power by year in Panel A of Table
3.1, and by Fama-French 12 industry classification in Panel B (Table 3.1). Table 3.1 shows the
number and percentage of firm-year observations headed by women CEOs as well as the number
and percentage of CEOs holding the dual position of CEO and chairman depicting CEO power.
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that no single year dominates the sample. Across the sample period,
it is notable that the percentage of firms with female CEOs increases steadily from 3.34% in 2000
to 7.69% in 2004 followed by a decline during 2007-2009 crisis. For the latter part of the sample
period, the percentage of firms headed by women CEOs increase from 3.55% in 2010 to 5.56%
in 2016. In contrast, the percentage of CEO-duality firms has decreased over the sample period
for both male and female CEOs. For instance, the percentage of CEO-duality firms headed by
women CEOs weaken from 71.4% from 2000 to 57.7% in 2016, while those headed by male
CEOs weaken from 63.45% in 2000 to 58.76% in 2016. The decline in CEO-duality firms over
time is the result of stricter regulations and enhanced scrutiny especially post 2007-2009 financial
crisis. Panel B (Table 3.1) presents the statistics across 10 Fama-French Industries (Financial
Industry and Utilities excluded). There is notable difference across industries in terms of women
leadership. Specifically, the percentage of firm-year observations with women CEOs ranges from a
low of 0.035% in Consumer Durables to a high of 1.00% in Wholesale, Retail and some Services.
The percentage of firm-year observations with women CEOs varies across industries, ranging from
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0.62% in Business Equipment to 0.24% in Chemicals and Allied Products.
3.4.3. Earnings Management
Following previous literature, we estimate two earnings management practices as a proxy for earn-
ings management: the opportunistic use of accruals, measured by current discretionary accruals
and real activities manipulation. To calculate real earnings manipulation, we use abnormal produc-
tion costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. (Farooqi, Harris, and Ngo 2014; Roychowdhury
2006) show that these two measures effectively capture real earnings manipulation. Myopic cor-
porate managers may resort to cutting advertising expenses and R&D expenditures to boost short
term earnings at the expense of long-term goals (Gupta, Pevzner, and Seethamraju 2010; Kothari,
Mizik, and Roychowdhury 2016). Overproduction entails higher production leading to a decrease
in per unit cost of the product and lowers the cost of sales. This improves the corporate gross profit
margin and attain earning thresholds. Hence, following existing empirical evidence, abnormal
discretionary expenses and production costs are measured using the following equations:
Disit
Assets(it−1)







Where Disit is the discretionary expenditure, which is the sum of firm’s advertising expenses
and R&D expenses in year t. Assets(it-1) is the total assets in year t-1 and Sit denotes net sales for
the firm in year t.
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Where Prodit is the sum of firm’s cost of goods sold and change in inventory in year t. Assets(it-1)
are the assets of the firm in year t-1, Sit are the net sales in year t. 4 Sit denotes the change in net
sales from year t-1 to t and4 S(it-1) is the change in net sales from year t-2 to year t-1.
Abnormal discretionary expenses and production costs are the residuals from the aforemen-
tioned estimation models. Higher abnormal production expenses and lower abnormal discretionary
expenses are consistent with income increasing real earnings manipulation. Hence, a proxy for real
earnings management is computed by the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses (multiplied by
-1) and abnormal production expenditures.
To estimate current discretionary accruals, we use a cross- sectional version of the modified
Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; Jones 1991) because of its superior classification
and less restrictive data requirements (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Cai et al. 2019). The
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following cross-sectional regression equation is used to estimate current accruals:
TAit
Assets(it−1)









+ ε(it ) (3.3)
Where for firm i and year t, TAit is total accruals of firm i in year t, which are equal to change
in non-cash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding the current portion of long-
term debt, minus depreciation and amortization. Assets(it-1) are the total assets of the firm i in year
t-1, 4Sit is the change in net sales of firm i from year t-1 to t, PPEit is the property, plant and
equipment of firm i for year t.
According to (Jones 1991), total accruals can be categorized into discretionary and non-discretionary
accruals. Non-Discretionary accruals are assumed to be affected by economic consequences and
discretionary accruals are a result of the manager’s perspective for reporting earnings (Hsieh et al.
2018). Equation 3.3 is estimated cross-sectional each year within the same industry (Fama-French
12 industry classification) to obtain the fitted value of accruals. The fitted value captures the non-
discretionary accruals and the difference between the observed value and the fitted value that is
the estimated residuals capture the current discretionary accruals, the absolute value of which is
proxied for earnings management
3.4.4. Other Variables
The models employed in our analysis include a number of firm, board and CEO characteristics
that have been found to influence earnings management. Following (Bergstresser and Philippon
2006), we use current ROA, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to begin-
ning total assets, to control for firm’s current performance that can determine the current earnings
management. Studies suggest that firms manipulate earnings to conceal poor performance (Chu
et al. 2019). To account for firm’s growth opportunities, we follow (Minton and Schrand 1999),
and use market to book ratio, computed as the ratio of market value of a firm to its book value at the
beginning of the year. We control for revenue growth from year t-1 to year t to account for actual
sales growth. We also control for firm size, measured as logarithm of total assets, as larger firms
face larger political costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1990) that can enhance earnings management
but also face enhanced scrutiny that can limit earnings management. As a proxy for risk, we used
standard deviation of operating cash flows scaled by beginning total assets and computed over a
three-year rolling period. Riskier firms are expected to engage in higher earnings management
to curb volatility. Altman’s Z-score is used to proxy financial health (Zang 2012), while E-index
(Entrenchment Index) is used as a proxy for corporate governance. We further control for a set of
demographic information of CEO including age (Ln(CEO age)), tenure (Ln (CEO tenure)) as well
as board characteristics to control for management quality. We control for board size (Ln (board
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size)), percentage of independent directors as well as the percentage of female directors on board.
Panel A of Table 3.2 provides summary statistics on the earnings management variables, CEO
power variables and other key CEO, board and firm characteristics. To minimize the impact of
extreme outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at top and bottom 1%. The variable abso-
lute current discretionary accruals (AbsDA) has a mean value of 0.032. The findings indicate, on
average a decline in earnings management using discretionary accruals. The previous study of (Cai
et al. 2019) find the mean absolute current discretionary accruals of 0.062 for the sample period
2000-2010. Real earnings manipulation (Real EM) on the other hand has a mean and median of
0.438 and 0.316 consistent with (Z. F. Li and Thibodeau 2019). Approximately 4.47% of the CEOs
in the sample are women and 60.6% of the CEOs hold the position of the chair in addition to CEO.
The average CEO pay slice is 0.34. The average corporate board consists of 8 members of which
nearly 75% are independent directors and 12% are female directors. On average, CEOs are 58.3
years old with 11.17 years of tenure at the CEO position.
Table 3.2, Panel B reports the Spearman correlation coefficients for main variables of interest.
We find that women CEOs are negatively related to Real EM and AbsDA providing preliminary
evidence that women CEOs engage in lesser earnings management. CEO duality and CEO pay
slice are positively and significantly correlated to real earnings management.
3.5. Results
3.5.1. Univariate results
Table 3.3 provides the univariate test results. It compares the firms headed by female CEOs to
those with male CEOs. It also compares the difference in firms headed by male and female CEOs
based on CEO duality. The mean absolute value of Real EM is 0.441 for firms headed by male
CEOs and 0.356 for firms led by female CEOs, the difference is significant at 5% level suggesting
that firms headed by female CEOs engage in less earnings management. However, in Panel B of
Table 3.3, the mean difference in Real EM between firms headed by male and female CEOs also
serving the position of chairman (CEO Dual) is 0.048 and is no longer significant. This indicates
that increase in CEO power reduces the gap in earnings management between male and female
CEOs, which supports our second hypothesis. Similar results are obtained using AbsDA as a proxy
for earnings management. Further, relative to male CEOs, female CEOs are younger, have shorter
tenure and lesser compensation. The fraction of independent and female directors on boards is
higher for female CEOs. Firms with female CEOs tend to be bigger, more profitable and are risker




In this section, we jointly test the effect of CEO gender and power on earnings management in a
multivariate setting by controlling for a set of firm and executive characteristics. The dependent
variables are earnings management proxies measured by real activities manipulation (Real EM)
and absolute value of current discretionary accruals (AbsDA) for each firm-year. The variables
of interest are CEO gender and CEO power. The indicator variable, CEO Fem, equals one if the
firm-year has a female CEO and zero otherwise. CEO power is measured by an indicator, CEO
Dual, which equals to one if the CEO holds the position of chair for a firm-year, zero otherwise.
We also use CEO pay slice (CPS) as a proxy of CEO power for robustness. We start by running
the following OLS model:
RealEMit/AbsDAit =
 β 0 +β 1CEOFem+β 2CEOpower+β 3CEOFem×CEOpower+ ∑ β 4 FirmlevelControls+∑ β 5 Board levelControls
+ ∑ β 6CEOlevelControls+ εit

(3.4)
We include Fama-French 12 industry, year and CEO fixed effects to control for variations in eco-
nomic operations for our sample firms across industries, years and CEOs. We report test statistics
and significance levels based on standard errors clustered by firm and year levels (Petersen 2009).
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 presents the regression results from Equation 3.4, which tests our two
hypotheses. Real Earnings Management (Real EM) is the dependent variable for Table 3.4 and
absolute value of current discretionary accruals (AbsDA) is the dependent variable for Table 3.5.
In Table 3.4 column (1), the coefficient of CEO Fem is negative and significant (-0.448) at 1%
level. This finding provides support for the first hypothesis that female CEOs, ceteris paribus, are
less likely to engage in earnings management relative to their male counterparts. This difference
in earnings management could be the result of fundamental differences between genders in terms
of risk-taking attitudes, overconfidence and ethical behaviors (Marianne 2011; Malmendier and
Tate 2008). However, it could also be attributed to the differences in incentive structures, unem-
ployment risk, as well as incongruity between the role of women in society and leadership roles
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Booth and Nolen 2012; Guiso et al. 2008). In column (2) of Table
3.4, we control for CEO power measured by CEO duality. Consistent with (Feng et al. 2011), we
find that the coefficient of CEO Dual is positive and significant at 5% level, suggesting that the
existence of CEO who is also the chairman reduces board effectiveness in monitoring the qual-
ity of financial reporting (Kamarudin, Ismail, and Mustapha 2012). Moreover, there is a positive
and significant coefficient on the interaction term between gender variable denoting female CEOs
and CEO duality (CEO Fem*Dual) shown in column (3). This result indicates that with increased
power, the propensity of female CEOs to engage in earnings management increases, consistent
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with our second hypothesis. Similar results are obtained when CEO pay slice (CPS) is used as a
proxy for CEO power in columns (6) and (7). In column (7), the coefficient of the interaction term
(CEO Fem*CPS) is positive but is insignificant. This provides evidence that women CEOs engage
in less earnings management only in the absence of power over the management team. In the pres-
ence of increased power, no significant relation between CEO gender and earnings management is
found. The results also show that fundamental differences in risk-taking and ethical behaviors be-
tween genders do not drive the decision-making process at top leadership positions consistent with
(Cook and Glass 2013).We further find that larger firms, more profitable firms, more volatile firms
engage in higher earnings management consistent with prior literature on earnings management
(Arun, Almahrog, and Aribi 2015; Harris, Karl, and Lawrence 2019). We also find the presence of
female directors leads to reduced earnings management.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.4, we partition the sample into two groups: firm-years with
high CEO power (CEO Dual = 1) and firm-years with low CEO power (CEO Dual= 0).The coef-
ficient of CEO Fem is negative and statistically significant (-0.806) at 1% for firm-years with low
CEO power (CEO Dual=0), depicted in column (5). However, for the sample of firm years with
high CEO power, the coefficient of CEO Fem is negative (-0.298) but loses significance relative to
low CEO power sample significant at 10% level). This suggests that with increased power, there is
no statistical difference in earnings management behavior between male and female CEOs exists,
consistent with the previous result.
Table 3.5 presents the regression results of the joint impact of CEO gender and power on
accruals-based earnings management. The dependent variable is absolute value of current discre-
tionary accruals (AbsDA). Consistent with previous results column (1) shows that women CEOs
are less likely to engage in earnings management with a coefficient of -0.003, significant at 5%
level. However, the coefficient on the interaction term (CEO Fem*Dual) in column (3) is nega-
tive but insignificant (-0.008). This suggests that in the presence of power, no significant relation
between CEO gender and earnings management exists. Similar to Table 3.4, we also partition the
sample based on CEO power and find the results to hold. For the firm-year observations with low
CEO power (CEO Dual=0), the coefficient of CEO Fem is negative and significant (-0.037) at 5%
level depicted in column (5). However, column (4) shows that for the sample of high CEO power
(CEO Dual=1) the coefficient of CEO Fem is negative but loses significance. This affirms that
women CEOs engage in less earnings management relative to their male counterparts only when
she has less power over the board and management.
Overall, the result is consistent with role congruity theory which underlines that women leaders
engaging in earnings management are perceived as less capable and quickly replaced as engaging
in earnings manipulations are not in line with their ‘expected’ gender roles associated with coop-
eration, welfare, honesty, and sustainability. Thus, increased scrutiny and fear of losing leadership
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roles lead women CEOs to engage in significantly less earnings management relative to their male
counterparts. However, increased CEO power moderates the relationship between CEO gender
and earnings quality. The women CEO who is also the chairman has the freedom to manage the
company and exert her will towards financial reporting. The above results show that in an increased
power environment, gender differences towards earnings management are not significant.
3.6. Endogeneity Concerns
Our results suggest that lack of CEO power engenders the negative relation between female CEOs
and earnings management. However, concerns in the prior literature suggest a self-selection bias
in the CEO hiring process violating the randomization assumption. Women leaders may choose
to work in certain types of firms or certain boards could be more inclined to hire women lead-
ers (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Adams and Ferreira 2009). Further, our results could be driven by
omitted firm characteristics that affect both earnings management and CEO gender. For example,
(Adhikari 2012) finds that in firms with higher inherent risk, women are excluded from top ex-
ecutive positions. In this section we adopt a propensity matched sample approach, instrumental
variable approach as well as a difference-in-differences analysis with CEO turnovers to rule out
any potential endogeneity concerns.
3.6.1. Evidence from matched samples
To address biased estimation because of the large disparity in the number of male and female
CEO firm-year observations and potential omitted variables concern, we analyze the difference in
earnings management behavior for male and female CEOs using a propensity matched sample ap-
proach. Following (Huang and Kisgen 2013), firm-years with female CEOs are matched with those
without, based on observable firm, board and CEO characteristics. Specifically, to employ propen-
sity score matching, we start by running a logit model that regresses the CEO gender variable
(CEO Fem) on a set of characteristics including total assets (Ln (Assets)), ROA (ROA), Leverage
(Leverage), Market-to-book ratio (MTB), revenue growth (Rev Growth), Board size (Board size)
and Logarithm of CEO age (CEO age), year and industry dummies. We then use propensity score
to perform a nearest neighbor match without replacement. We compare female CEO firm-year
observations with their corresponding propensity score matched male CEO firm-year observations
to re-examine the earnings management behavior of male and female CEOs, and the moderating
role of CEO power in this relation. Panel A of Table 3.6 provides the descriptive statistics for the
matched sample partitioned into firm years with high CEO power(CEO Dual=1) and low CEO
power(CEO Dual=0). We find that after propensity score matching, boards headed by female
CEOs have a larger board size and a greater fraction of independent and female directors. Further,
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male CEOs earn higher compensation than female CEOs. In the PSM sample, we continue to find
that real earnings management and absolute value of discretionary accruals to be higher for female
CEOs than male CEOs but are significant only for the low power CEOs (CEO dual=1).
Panel B of Table 3.6 reports the regression results based on propensity score matched samples.
We consistently find a negative coefficient on CEO Fem indicating that female CEOs engage in less
earnings management. We also find a positive coefficient on the interaction term (CEO Fem*Dual)
in column (3), significant at 10% level showing the moderating role of CEO power in the relation
between CEO gender and earnings management. We also partition the PSM sample into firm-year
observations based on CEO power. OLS regression results in columns (4) and (5) find that the
coefficient of CEO Fem to be negative for both columns but is statistically significant only for
firm-years with low CEO power. Overall, the results indicate that with increased power, there is no
statistical difference between earnings management behavior of male and female CEOs, consistent
with our two hypotheses.
3.6.2. Evidence from Instrumental Variable Approach
In order to further investigate the self-selection bias that might explain the above results, we re-
examine the relation between CEO gender, CEO power and earnings management using instru-
mental variable approach. Pursuant to previous studies, our IV approach is based on the exoge-
nous gender equality index developed by (Sugarman and Straus 1988). They constructed a gender
equality index considering economic, political and legal policies towards women in each of the 50
U.S. states. The score of the overall gender-equality index ranges from 19.2 (Mississippi) to 59.9
(Oregon). The index has been widely used as an instrument in the prior finance, accounting, man-
agement and gender studies literature (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Baixauli-Soler, Belda-Ruiz, and
Sanchez-Marin 2015; Frye and Pham 2018; Harris, Karl, and Lawrence 2019). However, post de-
velopment of this index in 1988, progress, innovation and outlook towards women has immensely
changed. Hence, for robustness, we also use the 2019 Bloomberg Gender-Equality Index (GEI) as
the instrument variable1. The index developed by Bloomberg takes into consideration economic
and legal policies towards gender equality including median pay ratio, female labor force partici-
pation health coverage for women and college degree attainment. The score of the gender-equality
index ranges between 0 and 100, with Vermont attaining the highest score of 86.40 and Missis-
sippi with the lowest score of 11.20. Following (Huang and Kisgen 2013), we posit that women
are more likely to occupy CEO positions in the states friendly towards women’s equality. We use
the headquarter location of the firm, the information about which is obtained from Compustat and
1Bloomberg Gender-Equality Index (GEI) tracks the financial performance of companies committed towards gen-
der equality. It also ranks the countries based on their adaptability to gender equality. The GEI for US states is obtained
from Bloomberg terminal
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assign a gender equality index to each state calculated by (Sugarman and Straus 1988) and by
Bloomberg. We find the mean of (Sugarman and Straus 1988) gender equality index (GenEqual
Old) to be 43.70 for our sample with a standard deviation of 8.04 while the mean of Bloomberg
gender equality index (GenEqual New) is 51.66 with a standard deviation of 17.42.
Using a two-stage IV approach, we first regress the endogenous variable CEO Fem on each
of the instrument variables (GenEqual Old; GenEqual New) and the set of firm characteristics
(Ln(Assets), ROA, Leverage, Market-to-book ratio (MTB), cash, Z score, board size, fraction of
independent directors and Ln(CEO age)). For the second stage regression, the predicted values of
the endogenous variable from the first stage are used to study the relation between CEO gender,
power and earnings management.
Table 3.7 provides the results for the first stage and second stage regressions. Panel A of Ta-
ble 3.7 shows the pairwise correlation between two gender equality indices (Gen Equality Old;
Gen Equality New), CEO gender indicator variable (CEO Fem) and earnings management proxies
(Real EM; AbsDA). We find that two gender equality indices to be positively and significantly
correlated to each other. We also find the CEO female dummy (CEO Fem) to be positively and
significantly correlated to the instrument variables. This shows that women CEOs have a higher
tendency to occupy executive roles in states that promote equal opportunity for women. The cor-
relation between real earnings management proxies and the two instrument variables is low and
insignificant. This validates the instrument variable as it induces changes in the explanatory vari-
able (CEO Fem) but has no independent effect on the dependent variables (Real EM and AbsDA)
Panel B and Panel C of Table 3.7 shows the results from first-stage and second-stage regres-
sions using (Sugarman and Straus 1988) gender equality index (GenEqual Old) and Bloomberg
gender equality index (GenEqual New) as the instrument variables respectively. Consistent with
(Huang and Kisgen 2013) and (Harris, Karl, and Lawrence 2019), we find the coefficient on the
instrument variable in the first stage regression is positive and significant at 5%. This confirms the
strong relation between gender equality index and having a women CEO. The F-statistic from the
first stage regressions using instrument variables are 14.157 and 11.148, significant at 1% level.
Further, female CEOs hired are young, have lower tenures and have a higher fraction of indepen-
dent directors.
For the second stage regression, we use Real EM as the dependent variable2. Consistent
with previous results, Panel B of Table 3.7 shows the coefficient of interaction variable (CEO
Fem*Dual) is positive but insignificant suggesting that with increased power, the relation between
female CEOs and earnings management is positive but insignificant. The coefficient of the inter-
action variable (CEO Fem*CPS) is negative but also insignificant. The propensity of female CEOs
to engage in significantly less earnings management is only in the absence of CEO power as sug-
2Ran the regression using AbsDA as the dependent variable and obtained similar results.
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gested by a negative and significant coefficient of CEO Fem in the sub-sample of firms with low
CEO power. Thus, the results overall affirm that earnings management behavior of women CEOs
is not driven by their risk-taking abilities or ethical attitudes but is governed by the discrimination
they face after occupying top executive roles. Consistent results are found using Bloomberg gen-
der equality index (GenEqual New) reported in Panel C of Table 3.7. This relationship affirms our
previous finding that as the power increases, the propensity to engage in earnings management for
women CEOs also increases. Further, significant differences in earnings management behavior is
found between male and female CEOs only within low CEO power subgroup.
3.6.3. Evidence from CEO turnovers
In addition to propensity score matching and instrumental variable approach to address the endoge-
nous concern, we examine CEO turnovers and the associated changes in earnings management.
This analysis compares the difference in earnings management for the same firm due to changes
in CEOs. Therefore, if any trends in earnings management followed by the firm prior to change in
CEO impact the results, this difference-in-difference analysis using CEO turnovers should alleviate
the bias.
In this analysis, we identify firm-year observations when a change in CEO appears in the ISS
database. We differentiate CEO transitions into two types depending on the gender of incoming
and outgoing CEOs: male-to-female (M-F) and female-to-male (F-M) CEO transitions. For com-
parison, we also consider male-to-male (M-M) CEO transitions. We construct a sample of CEO
turnovers following (Huang and Kisgen 2013). Panel A of Table 3.8 reports the change in earn-
ings management for the sample of executive turnovers. Our CEO transitions sample contains
142 male-to-female transitions, 192 female-to-male transitions and 796 male-to-male transitions
for the sample period 2000-2016. We find that in around 87% of male-to-female transitions (124
transitions), firms experience a decline in earnings management when a woman CEO replaces a
male CEO. However, the maximum change is experienced when the transition to women CEOs
is also accompanied by a decline in CEO power, significant at 1% level. The decline in earnings
management when the incoming women CEOs also resides over as chairman while the outgoing
male CEOs have low power is only significant at 10% level. Female-to-male CEO transitions on
the other hand experience an increase in earnings management following the transition. The in-
crease is largest when the incoming male CEO also presides over as chairman while the outgoing
women CEO had low power. This again shows that CEO power measured by duality impacts the
relation between CEO gender and earnings management.
Panel B of Table 3.8 examines the change in earnings management around each of the CEO
turnovers in terms of gender and power using regression analysis. We calculate the change in real
Earnings Management (Change in Real EM) as the difference between the real earnings manage-
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ment one year after the transition (t+1) and one year prior to the transition (t-1), where t is the
year of CEO transition. To run the regression analysis, we partition the CEO transitions based on
duality. As per our hypothesis, we expect CEO power to weaken the negative relation between
CEO gender and earnings management. This is indeed what we find. In Model (2), we find that
for CEO transitions from duality to non-duality, firms with women CEOs replacing male CEOs
experience the largest decline, significant at 1% level, followed by male CEOs replacing female
CEOs. Model (1) on the other hand, shows that a male CEO replacing a women CEO experience
the greatest increase, significant at 1% level. The transition in male-to-male CEOs experience
increase in earnings management but is not statistically significant.
Overall, the CEO turnover analysis affirms that women CEOs engage in lesser earnings man-
agement relative to male CEOs. However, CEO power acts as a moderator and weakens the relation
between CEO gender and earnings. The decline in earnings management is not statistically sig-
nificant when the incoming women CEOs hold power by occupying the dual position of CEO and
chairman. The results also suggest that this relation is unlikely to be driven by endogeneity.
3.7. Additional Analysis
3.7.1. Alternate Model Specifications
Thus far, we have shown that power has a significant influence on the relation between CEO
gender and earnings quality. In this section we use an alternate model specification to compare
earnings management behavior of male and female CEOs in the presence of power. The analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA) is a statistical procedure for looking at group effects on the outcome
variable controlling for continuous explanatory variables. Developed and popularized by (Fisher
1954), ANCOVA generates prediction equations for various levels of the categorical variable of
interest and is widely used in biological clinical experiments to evaluate the difference in treatment
effect between treated and non-treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984; Miller and Chapman
2001). Hence, in addition to the OLS model, we also run the ANCOVA model to compare the
differences in earnings management practices by male and female CEOs moderated by power. We
generate a categorical variable (CEO Gen Power), which takes the value of one if the CEO is female
(CEO Fem=1) and is also the chairman (CEO Dual=1), two if the CEO is female (CEO Fem=1)
but does not preside over the board as chairman (CEO Dual=0) and three if the CEO is male (CEO
Fem=0) and does not occupy the position of chairman (CEO Dual=0).The ANCOVA model is
a conditional model that will test the differences for each of the three groups of the categorical
variable (CEO Gen Power) with the base category. In this setting, we use the base category as the
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male CEO who is also the chairman of the board. The ANCOVA model is described as:
RealEMit/AbsDAit = α 0 +α 1 Git +∑α 3ControlVariablesit + εit (3.5)
Where Git is the difference in CEO gender and power and coefficient captures the impact of dif-
ference in CEO gender and power on outcome variable (Real EM and AbsDA). Specifically, it
captures the average change in earnings management dependent on difference in female and male
CEOs as well as power. One advantage of the ANCOVA model of relevance is, it allows to con-
trol for baseline differences, that is, differences in firms and management that can impact earnings
management practices.
Table 3.9 provides the results for the ANCOVA models for the full sample and the matched
samples. We use Real EM and AbsDA as the dependent variables. The coefficient on CEO Dual
Female, which captures the difference in earnings management between powerful female and male
CEOs (CEO Gen Power=1 – CEO Gen power=0) is positive but insignificant for the full sample as
well as matched sample, depicted in columns (1) and (3). This confirms that in the presence
of power, no significant difference in real earnings management behavior is found between male
and female CEOs. However, for women CEOs without power, the coefficient on CEO Non-Dual
Female in columns (1) and (3) (CEO Gen Power=2 – CEO Gen Power=0) is negative and significant
at 1% level for full as well as matched samples. Hence, in the absence of power, women CEOs
engage in significantly lower real earnings management than their male counterparts with power.
Further, we find low-power male CEOs also engage in significantly lower earnings management
as the coefficient on CEO Non-Dual Male is negative and significant at 1% for the full sample and
10% for the matched sample. Similar results are obtained using absolute discretionary accruals
(AbsDA) as the dependent variable. These results bring out the moderating role of power in the
relation between CEO gender and earnings management and support our principal argument that
gender differences in earnings management do not remain robust given the power CEOs hold.
3.8. Conclusion
In recent years, research in the area of behavioral finance has stressed on the impact of personal
traits like gender on various firm outcomes. This is attributed to the differences in risk aversion,
ethical considerations and leadership styles between men and women. For example, (Croson and
Gneezy 2009; Barber and Odean 2001) find gender differences lead to greater risk aversion in
investment decisions for women. Similarly, (Farrell and Hersch 2005) observe a negative relation
between firm risk and presence of female directors. Further, (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2016)
find firms run by women CEOs to have lower leverage and less volatile earnings. However, some
studies find opposite results. For example, (Adams and Funk 2012) suggest that women directors
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successful in breaking the glass ceiling are more like men and find female directors to be more risk-
loving than male directors. Similarly, (Berger, Kick, and Schaeck 2014) study the demographic
characteristics of executive officers, including gender on portfolio risk and find a positive link
between female representation on boards and bank risk.
Our study, therefore, seeks to extend the literature by considering the impact of CEO gender on
earnings management. Our empirical analysis indicates that earnings management behavior of all
CEOs irrespective of gender are influenced by the power they hold while in tenure. In particular,
we find women CEOs engage in less earnings management only in the absence of power over the
management team. Consistent with glass cliff hypothesis and role congruity theory, the results sug-
gest that women CEOs diverge from conservative risk averse behaviors and ethical considerations
once they can exert influence over the board and the decision-making process.
Our paper, provides a novel contribution to the gender and earnings management literature by
showing the moderating role of power in the CEO gender and earnings management relationship. It
suggests that gender discriminations in the form of glass cliffs and role incongruities are important
factors that affect earnings reporting quality. The research provides additional avenues for future
research to provide evidence on leadership emergence of women CEOs and its impact on various
corporate outcomes.
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Table 3.1: Sample Distribution
The Table provides distribution of female led CEOs and industry breakdown of the sample firms.Panel A
provides distribution of female led CEOs and the number and percentage of high power and low power
CEOs measured by CEO duality. Panel B provides distribution of sample firms and female led CEOs by
industry.
Panel A: Firm year distribution by calendar year
Year
# of firm year
obs
# of firm year
with fem CEOs
# of firm year obs
with Dual Female CEOs
# of firm year obs
with Dual Male CEOs
2000 419 14 (3.34%) 10 (71.4%) 257 (63.45%)
2001 450 29 (6.44%) 17 (58.6%) 273 (64.84%)
2002 482 22 (4.56%) 14 (63.63%) 276 (60%)
2003 529 33 (6.23%) 21 (63.63%) 305 (61.49%)
2004 533 41 (7.69%) 25 (60.97%) 307 (62.39%)
2005 498 27(5.42%) 13 (48.14%) 280 (59.44%)
2006 521 22 (4.22%) 16 (72.72%) 291 (58.31%)
2007 388 12 (3.09%) 7 (58.33%) 220 (58.51%)
2008 549 12 (2.18%) 8 (66.66%) 328 (61.08%)
2009 618 24 (3.88%) 15 (62.5%) 362 (60.94%)
2010 647 23 (3.55%) 15 (65.21%) 373 (59.77%)
2011 933 34 (3.64%) 24 (70.58%) 547 (60.84%)
2012 950 33 (3.47%) 16 (48.48%) 536 (58.45%)
2013 956 41 (4.28%) 21 (51.12%) 578 (63.16%)
2014 969 42 (4.33%) 26 (61.9%) 536 (57.82%)
2015 956 42 (4.39%) 22 (52.38%) 585 (64%)
2016 809 45 (5.56%) 26 (57.7%) 449 (58.76%)
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Panel B: Firm year distribution by industry





% of female CEO
led firms
Consumer Non-Durables 858 7.65% 0.51%
Consumer Durables 360 3.21% 0.035%
Manufacturing 1,933 17.24% 0.758%
Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction
and Products
672 5.99% 0.124%
Chemicals and Allied Products 564 5.03% 0.24%








Other 1,575 14.05% 0.61%
Total 11,207 100%
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
The Table provides summary statistics and Pearson Correlation of the main variables of interest.Panel A
provides Mean, Median, Standard Deviation, 25th Pctl and 75th Pctl of earnings management variables,
CEO characteristics, board characteristics and firm characteristics. Panel B provides provides Pearson
Correlation matrix for main variables of interest.Difference in means and their statistical significance is
based on a t-test.The symbol * indicate statistical significance at 10% level and under.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variables No of obs Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
Main Variables of Interest
Real Erng Mgt (Real EM) 9,860 0.4381 0.316 0.644 -0.028 0.665
Abs DA 9,000 0.0302 0.021 0.037 0.008 0.039
CEO_Fem 11,207 0.044 0 0.205 0 0
CEO_Dual 11,207 0.606 1 0.488 0 1
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 8,161 0.350 0.342 0.107 0.240 0.432
CEO Characteristics
CEO age 11,202 58.34 58 7.092 54 63
CEO Tenure 7,384 11.17 9.68 7.431 6.117 14.279
CEO Total Compensation (000’s) 10,926 8,777.85 4,693.241 31,251.39 2,442.336 8,503.39
CEO equity Compensation (000’s) 9,899 4,593.32 2,812.65 9,717.032 1,274.98 5,600.17
Board Characteristics
Board Size 11,207 7.99 8 3.075 6 10
No of Independent Directors 11,207 6.13 6 2.881 4 8
No of Female Directors 11,207 1,09 1 1.055 0 2
Firm Characteristics
Firm Size ( $ millions) 11,207 10,731.94 2,320.155 35,886.42 855.338 7,167
Ln(Assets) 11,207 7.895 7.749 1.535 6.751 8.877
ROA 11,207 0.049 0.055 0.113 0.024 0.0921
Market-to-book ratio 11,193 3.988 2.454 6.778 1.597 3.901
Revenue Growth 8,983 6.655 5.632 21.33 -1.479 13.357
Cash 11,206 0.148 0.094 0.152 0.035 0.210
Std Dev Sales 7,868 0.284 0.247 0.251 0.146 0.367
Z-Score 10,911 4.744 3.668 4.573 2.451 5.496
E-index 10,338 3.33 3 1.288 3 4
Panel B: Pairwise Correlations
Real EM Abs DA CEO_Fem CEO_dual CEO_Payslice
Real EM 1.00
Abs DA 0.0347* 1.00
CEO_Fem -0.024* -0.047* 1.00
CEO_Dual 0.0504* 0.0074 -0.004 1.00
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 0.0136 0.0152* -0.0159 -0.0148 1.00
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Table 3.3: Univariate Analysis
The Table (Panel A) shows difference in means of earnings management variables, CEO, firm and board-level characteris-
tics for male and female CEOs.Panel B provides difference in means of earnings management, CEO, firm and board char-
acteristics for male and female CEOs differentiated by power measured by CEO duality.Difference in means and their statisti-
cal significance is based on a t-test.The symbol 3,2,1 indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Univariate Analysis Based
on gender Panel B: Univariate Analysis Based on CEO Power measured by CEO Duality
Male CEOs Fem CEOs Difference Dual CEOs Non-Dual CEOs
Male CEOs Fem CEOs Difference Male CEOs Fem CEOs Difference
Real EM 0.441 0.356 0.0852 0.510 0.462 0.048 0.4106 0.132 0.2783
Abs DA 0.0306 0.0221 0.0083 0.0309 0.0214 0.0092 0.0302 0.0230 0.0072
CEO age 58.40 57.21 1.1842 58.42 56.72 1.692 58.36 57.93 0.430
CEO tenure 11.260 9.457 1.8023 11.341 9.366 1.9751 11.131 9.589 1.5453
Comp($ mil) 8.82 7.74 1.0743 8.79 7.47 1.322 8.86 8.14 .721
Eq Comp 0.56 0.55 0.0063 0.55 0.56 -0.015 0.56 0.55 0.0163
Board Size 7.97 8.48 -0.5103 7.959 8.408 -0.4492 7.99 8.595 -0.5993
# Fem Dir 1.04 2.13 -1.093 1.04 2.10 -1.053 1.03 2.19 -1.153
# Ind Dir 6.113 6.673 -0.5593 6.103 6.618 -0.5143 6.129 6.755 -0.6253
Ln(Assets) 7.883 8.147 -0.2633 7.884 8.105 -0.2201 7.881 8.208 -0.3273
ROA 0.049 0.057 -0.0083 0.048 0.060 -0.0112 0.049 0.052 -0.0033
MTB 3.993 3.883 0.110 4.350 2.129 2.221 3.440 6.479 -3.0383
StDev Sales 0.285 0.267 0.0182 0.285 0.283 0.001 0.286 0.243 0.0422
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Table 3.4: CEO Gender, Power and Real Earnings Management: OLS regression
The Table reports the panel data regression results on the joint impact of CEO gender and power on Real Earnings
Management (Real EM). The table also reports the OLS regression results for the relation between CEO gender on
earnings management for sub-samples formed based on CEO Duality. The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical signif-
icance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: Real EM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
















































































































































































































No of Obs 9,860 9,860 9,860 6,016 3,844 8,161 8,161
R-Squared 0.054 0.042 0.075 0.094 0.095 0.194 0.18
Year/Industry/
CEO fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.5: CEO Gender, Power and Discretionary Accruals: OLS regression
The Table reports the panel data regression results on the joint impact of CEO gender and power on Absolute value of
discretionary accruals (AbsDA). The table also reports the OLS regression results for the relation between CEO gen-
der on earnings management for sub-samples formed based on CEO Duality. The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var: AbsDA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
















































































































































































































No of Obs 9,000 9,000 9,000 5,510 3,490 8,161 8,161
R-Squared 0.054 0.019 0.11 0.10 0.095 0.13 0.11
Year/Industry/
CEO fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.6: CEO gender and power on Earnings Management: Evidence using matched sam-
ples
The Table reports the joint impact of CEO gender and power on earnings management using a matched
sample. Panel A reports the difference in means of earnings management, firm, board and CEO
characteristics between male and female CEO firm-year observations segregated by CEO duality for the
matched sample. Panel B reports presents the results of the regression of Real EM on CEO Fem, CEO
power and the interaction variable (CEOFem*Dual). The Table also reports the regression results for the
impact of CEO gender on real earnings management for the matched sample segregated on CEO
Duality.The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Matched Samples
Duality=1 Duality=0
Male CEOs Fem CEOs Difference Male CEOs Fem CEOs Difference
Real EM 0.543 0.513 0.030 0.392 -0.177 0.379***
AbsDA 0.028 0.021 0.006 0.032 0.014 0.018**
CEO age 57.53 56.62 0.836* 58.10 57.93 0.167
CEO tenure 10.97 9.37 1.60** 10.45 9.59 0.855
CEO Eq Comp 0.568 0.567 0.001 0.564 0.556 0.007
CEO Total Comp ($mil) 8.10 7.49 .613* 9.701 8.175 1.525*
Board Size 7.80 8.40 -0.606** 7.90 8.58 -0.683**
Frac of Ind Dir 5.898 6.613 -0.715*** 5.954 6.743 -0.788***
Frac of Fem Dir 1.08 2.10 -1.021*** 1.033 2.195 -1.16***
Ln(Assets) 7.815 8.108 -0.293** 7.866 8.213 -0.346*
ROA 0.059 0.060 -0.169 0.058 0.061 -0.003
Rev Growth 6.381 7.918 -1.536 6.311 8.086 -1.775
Cash 0.140 0.139 0.001 0.155 0.160 -0.004
StDev Sales 0.293 0.283 0.010 0.240 0.243 -0.003
E-Index 3.32 3.21 0.100 3.402 3.101 0.300**
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Panel B: CEO Gender, Power and Earnings Management: Evidence from Matched Samples
Dep Var: Real EM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)














































































































































































































































No of Obs 756 756 756 464 292 614 614
R-Squared 0.113 0.065 0.11 0.096 0.095 0.08 0.12
Year/Industry/
CEO fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.7: CEO Gender, Power and Earnings Management: Instrumental Variable Ap-
proach
The Table provides the estimation of the impact of CEO gender and power on earnings management us-
ing Instrumental Variable approach. Panel A provides the pairwise correlation between the two instrument
variables (Gen Equality Old;Gen Equality New) and the CEO gender indicator variable (CEO Fem) and earn-
ing management variables (Real EM; AbsDA). Panel B reports the first stage and second stage regression
results.Model 1 reports the first stage regression of Gen Equality Old on CEO Fem. Model 2 provides the
second stage regression results using the predicted values of CEO Fem from first stage to examine the impact
of CEO gender and earnings management. Panel C reports the first stage regression of Gen Equality New
on CEO Fem. Model 2 provides the second stage regression results using the predicted values of CEO
Fem from first stage to examine the impact of CEO gender and earnings management.The symbol ***,**,*
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Pairwise Correlations between CEO gender, power and instrument variables
Gen Equality Old Gen Equality New CEO Fem Real EM AbsDA
Gen Equality Old 1
Gen Equality New 0.6122* 1
CEO Fem 0.0411* 0.0512* 1
Real EM 0.0036 0.0051 -0.0274* 1
AbsDA 0.0076 0.0020 -0.0475* 0.0343* 1
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Panel B: CEO gender, Power and Earnings Management: Regression using first Instrument Variable
Dep Var CEO Fem Real EM
Model 1: First stage Regression Model 2: Second Stage Regression


















































































































































No of obs 10,787 9,860 9,860 5,966 3,894‘
R-Squared 0.07 0.14 0.135 0.15 0.13
F-Statistic 14.157***
Firm/year
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel C: CEO gender, power and Earnings Management: Regression using second Instrument Vari-
able
Dep Var CEO Fem Real EM
Model 1: First stage Regression Model 2: Second Stage Regression


















































































































































No of obs 10,787 9,860 9,860 5,966 3,894‘
R-Squared 0.089 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13
F-Statistic 11.148
Firm/year
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.8: CEO gender, power and Earnings Management: Evidence from CEO turnovers
The Table reports the estimation of joint impact of CEO gender and power on earnings management using
CEO transitions.Panel A provides descriptive statistics on change in real earnings management following
Male-to-female (M-F) CEO transitions, Female-to-male (F-M) CEO transitions and Male-to-Male (M-M)
CEO transitions further segregated on change in CEO power.Difference in means and their statistical
significance is based on a t-test. Panel B reports the estimation of the impact of CEO transitions on
earnings management for change in CEO power.The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.




















Non-dual to Dual 46 -0.214* 57 0.231*** 181 0.0219 -0.445***
Dual to Non-dual 48 -0.292*** 54 0.043 198 -0.045 -0.335*
Dual to Dual 18 0.0251 54 0.160 287 -0.003 -0.135
Non-dual to Non-dual 30 -0.176** 27 0.0345 130 -0.105 -0.215*
Panel B: Changes in Earnings Management around CEO turnovers: Regression Analysis
Dep Var














































Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Board Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.129 0.10 0.11 0.10
Year/Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.9: CEO gender, power and Earnings Management: Alternate Model Specifications
The Table provides the ANCOVA regression results as an alternate model specification to es-
timate the joint impact of CEO gender and power on earnings management for the whole
sample and matched sample.To run the ANCOVA model,generate a categorical variable
CEO Gen Power that takes the value of 1 if CEO Dual Female=1, 2 if CEO Non-Dual Fem=1
and 3 ifCEO Non-Dual Male=1.We control for other firm, board and CEO characteristics.The
symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Full Sample Matched Sample

















































































































































No of Obs 9,860 9,000 756 748
R-Squared 0.1378 0.188 0.145 0.13
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Chapter 4
Corporate Social Responsibility and Market
Value of Firms
4.1. Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has continued to gain importance in managerial practice
over the last several decades (Knox and Maklan 2004) and an increasing number of Fortune 1000
companies now issue corporate social responsibility reports. Documenting this trend, the KPMG
International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (2011) found that ninety-five percent
of the 250 largest companies in the world (G250) now report their actions on corporate responsibil-
ity separately. This represents an increase of 14% since 2008. And yet, despite years of research,
the relationship between the market valuation of a firm and its CSR activities remains unclear
(Margolis and Walsh 2003; McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright 2006). While early studies treated
CSR as an obligation on businesses to pursue policies that are desirable in terms of the objectives
and values of society (Bowen 2013), subsequent ones contend that CSR is ‘fundamentally sub-
versive’ of the true responsibilities of business and a barrier to enhancing profitability (Friedman
1970)
This paper provides a new perspective on this relationship by focusing directly on the rela-
tionship between a firm’s stock price performance and CSR based on intent or motive behind CSR
initiations. Firms strategically utilize symbolic and substantive CSR (Li et al. 2019) to either repair
reputational damage following negative societal events or undertake actions intended to integrate
CSR in the overall business objectives. In the past, controversies have arisen when firms have
been found to indulge in negative events leading to severe reputational risks. In response to such
controversies, firms engage in CSR activities to repair their lost damage and reputation. Such in-
dulgence in CSR activities, called symbolic CSR is for the sole purpose to regain shareholder trust
(Oliver 1991). The market reaction to symbolic CSR may be different be from substantive CSR
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investments directed towards corporate philanthropy. In this paper, we examine the impact of CSR
on stock returns based on firms’ choice of symbolic or substantive CSR.
Following (Prakash, Ravi, and Zhao 2017; Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Walker and Wan 2012),
we start by classifying CSR activities into symbolic and substantive CSR. Symbolic CSR refers to
CSR initiatives implemented in response to the adverse impact of negative events. Such actions are
initiated to attend to stakeholder demands without making substantive changes to their systems and
operations, allowing firms to maintain legitimacy without significant strategic change (Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991). In contrast, substantive CSR involves complete CSR implementation.
The firm’s underlying systems and processes are altered in a holistic attempt to improve the status
quo of a particular societal or environmental context such as closing the production loop by re-
using manufacturing waste as a production input. We examine the link between each of the CSR
activities and subsequent stock price performance of a firm.
Our findings indicate a strong connection between the stock price changes and CSR activity.
In particular, we find that the market responds positively to symbolic CSR while negatively to
substantive CSR. Media attention towards negative firm events puts a corporation’s reputation at
risk and firms engagement in symbolic CSR acts as a quick response from the firm to show that
it is doing something to ‘fix the problem’ (Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, and Hill 2006). This results
in a positive response from the market leading to a positive symbolic CSR-annual stock returns
relationship. Substantive CSR, on the other hand often requires subsequent changes in operations,
systems and processes. Such investments require a high level of coordination and integration. The
cost of implementing substantive CSR may be higher than the benefits in the short-term and leads
shareholders’ to view it as a manifestation of agency conflict. Consistent with over-investment
hypothesis (Barnea and Rubin 2010), substantive CSR is viewed as investments undertaken by
managers to build their personal reputation at the cost of shareholder wealth maximization leading
to a negative impact on annual returns.
We further explore the impact of CSR activity on the stock price by examining the subset of
family firms in our sample. Since family firms are expected to have a long-term outlook with a
deep interest in the eventual survival and performance of the firm (Anderson and Reeb 2003), we
expect CSR activities, in particular substantive CSR activities, will not be perceived as an agency
cost by stakeholders. Consistent with our conjecture we find that the negative association between
substantive CSR and subsequent stock price performance is absent for family firms.
Our findings have several interesting implications for the literature on CSR activity. First, we
extend the findings of (Prakash, Ravi, and Zhao 2017) and find that crucial differences underlying
CSR activities impact subsequent stock returns. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, we pro-
vide a detailed description of how the stock market reacts to CSR based on the intent or motivation
behind CSR activities. Our results indicate that there is a conflict of interest between shareholders
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and managers with respect to the optimal level of CSR activity. In particular, substantive CSR ac-
tivities elicit similar reactions from shareholders as do the consumption of perquisites in that they
are valued higher by managers than external shareholders, consistent with over-investment hypoth-
esis (Barnea and Rubin 2010). In contrast, the market has a more favorable reaction to symbolic
CSR activity. Our results indicate that much like the large event study literature in finance, it is
possible to glean a fair amount of information on the value relevance of CSR activity from the stock
market’s reaction to it. Third, we also fill the gap in the existing CSR firm value relation literature.
The existing empirical literature studying the impact of CSR on firm value yields mixed evidence
with some evidence pointing towards a positive impact of CSR on firm value while some depicting
negative or no market value-CSR relationship (Krüger 2015; Jiao 2010; Di-Giuli and Kostovetsky
2014; Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog 2016). Our research contributes to this equivocal question by
examining the CSR-stock return relation moderated by the motive behind CSR initiations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the prior literature and
hypothesis development Section 3 describes our data and variable description. Section 4 and 5
provides our main empirical results and additional analysis Section 6 concludes.
4.2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has attracted the attention of several academicians and re-
searchers in the past three decades. Most of the prior literature centering on the relation between
CSR and firm value finds that CSR affects firm value through different channels leading to con-
trasting results and implications. The empirical evidence on the relation between CSR and firm
value is mixed and inconclusive, with many of the studies finding a positive impact of CSR on
firm value, but some providing evidence for negative or no relation between the two (Margolis and
Walsh 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh 2009). (Jo and
Harjoto 2011) summarize several competing theories that explain why corporations engage in CSR
and their impact on firm value.
In addition to the above conflicting arguments, the market reaction to CSR investments also
yields mixed results (Kempf and Osthoff 2007; Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). Prior literature pro-
vides two opposing views of CSR that influence the relation between CSR and market value of
firms. Stakeholder value maximization theory (Freeman 2010) proposes that the aim of a corpora-
tion is stakeholder wealth maximization and the management should consider the effects of their
actions on customers, suppliers, employees and other stakeholders (Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar
2004; Lee 2008; Schaefer and Kerrigan 2008). This line of study advocates that investment in CSR
to balance social goals along with shareholder wealth maximization will lead to positive market
reaction (Baron 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 2014; Skarmeas and Leonidou 2013). For example, (Klassen
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and McLaughlin 1996) find, for a sample of US firms initiating positive environmental activities
result in significant positive returns. (Becchetti et al. 2012) find that US firms exiting from the
KLD Domini 400 Social Index experience significantly negative abnormal returns.
However, in contract to the stakeholder value maximization theory, the over-investment theory
(Barnea and Rubin 2010) suggests that shareholders associate investment in CSR as means by
management to extract private benefits from the firm and build their personal reputation. Based on
agency theory, insiders over-invest in CSR to be entrenched as socially responsible managers at the
expense of shareholders (Griffin and Mahon 1997; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Schuler and Cording
2006). (Mathur and Mathur 2000) find that announcements related to green promotional efforts by
firms led to significant abnormal returns for 20 days while announcements for green products did
not result in significant stock price changes. Based on the sample of 780 announcements from the
daily business press, (Jacobs, Singhal, and Subramanian 2010) also find insignificant stock market
reaction to environmental initiations by firms.
This study contributes to the conflicting evidence on the stock market relation to CSR by clas-
sifying CSR based on the intent behind such activities. (Rangan, Chase, and Karim 2015) find that
companies initiate multifaceted versions of CSR with intentions ranging from pure philanthropy,
improving operational effectiveness to advertising propaganda. They further find that companies
widely range in intentions behind CSR investments, whereby some companies embrace the broad
vision of CSR while others seem less interested in integrating CSR with their business strate-
gies and devise a cogent CSR program in lieu of pressures from regulators and underlying parties
(Campbell 2007; Keys, Malnight, and Van Der Graaf 2009). (Aguilera et al. 2007) finds that
CSR initiations are driven by normative views embedded in corporate values aimed at fulfilling the
firm’s moral responsibilities.
We address the gap in the CSR literature by exploring the impact of motives dictating social
activities on the CSR-stock returns relationship. Prior studies suggest that firms can engage in CSR
activities to mitigate the adverse impact of negative events or enhance firm reputation. (Prakash,
Ravi, and Zhao 2017; Walker and Wan 2012). Symbolic CSR refers to social actions attributed to
mitigate the risk of reputational damage following a negative CSR event (Klein and Dawar 2004).
Symbolic CSR is intended to display conformity to the demands of external regulators without
necessarily involving any meaningful change (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991). Substantive
CSR on the other hand, involves strategies towards complete CSR implementation. The firm’s
underlying systems and processes are altered in a holistic attempt to improve the status quo of
a particular societal or environmental context such as closing the production loop by re-using
manufacturing waste as a production input.(Zott and Huy 2007)
The choice of the type of CSR initiated by firms (symbolic vs substantive) is influenced by
relative costs and benefits associated with each type (Bowen 2013) as well as media attention
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towards negative CSR events. (Li et al. 2019) suggests that firms choose symbolic CSR over
substantive CSR for two reasons. First, media attention towards a negative CSR event requires a
quick response from the firm to mitigate reputational damage. Thus, firms engage in symbolic CSR
to regain legitimacy with stakeholders. Second, symbolic CSR is less expensive and is a lower
cost alternative to substantive CSR and such investment can help managers build their personal
reputation at the cost of shareholder wealth maximization.
The market reaction towards CSR based on the intent or motive behind CSR activities is an
empirical question yet not considered in the finance literature. Allocation towards symbolic CSR
resources are short-term actions initiated to regain the lost reputation resulting from negative en-
vironmental, social or legal events. Substantive CSR investment on the other is undertaken to
encompass dual objectives of societal welfare and shareholder wealth organization. In this study,
we examine whether the stock market reacts differently to the two types of CSR. We posit that
as symbolic CSR is initiated as a response to rebuild the lost brand image and any initiation in
symbolic CSR is viewed as management’s efforts to “fix the problem” as soon as possible. This
may result in a positive market reaction to symbolic CSR, consistent with shareholder value max-
imization theory. However, increased scrutiny as a result of increased media coverage may also
lead to increased stakeholder monitoring. Symbolic CSR initiation undertaken may thus be viewed
as short-cut resource allocation in lieu of pressures from regulators and stakeholders might lead to
a negative relation between symbolic CSR and stock returns (over-investment hypothesis). The
substantive CSR-stock returns relationship is also an empirical question. On one hand, invest-
ment in substantive CSR may receive positive stock market reaction as substantive investments are
undertaken to balance the societal objectives with the firm’s objectives. On the other hand, such
initiation could be viewed as investments to extract private benefits and personal reputation at the
expense of shareholder wealth maximization.
4.3. Data and Variable Construction
4.3.1. Data and Sample Selection
Our initial sample consists of all firms in the MSCI KLD database for the years 2000-2013. The
MSCI database is the most widely used in CSR studies and covers companies in S&P 500 and
Russell 3000 index. We begin our sample in 2000 as before the year, the coverage of firms’ CSR
activities in MSCI is incomplete. Our sample ends in 2013 as post that year, majority of the data
is missing. We obtain stock price data from the CRSP monthly files. Information on firm financial
and accounting characteristics is collected from COMPUSTAT database. After merging MSCI,
CRSP and COMPUSTAT dataset, the final sample consists of 25,823 firm-year observations for
the period 2000-2013.
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4.3.2. Symbolic and Substantive CSR
MSCI organizes CSR into seven dimensions: environment, community, human rights, employee
relations, diversity, product, and governance (See Appendix D for detailed description of KLD
dimensions). Under each of these dimensions, CSR engagement is rated into two broad groups of
strengths score and concerns score. MSCI assigns ‘+1’ strength and ‘–1’ for concern under each
dimension. We drop ‘corporate governance’ dimension as previous research shows that corporate
governance coverage is incomplete (Krüger 2015). Extant studies have typically aggregated the
strengths and concerns in seven dimensions into an index, to proxy for the overall CSR of the
firm (Ullmann 1985; Waddock and Graves 1997; Hull and Rothenberg 2008). However, (Prakash,
Ravi, and Zhao 2017) points out that this can be potentially problematic, as strengths and concerns
are ordinal in nature. For example, a score of +1 on environment is not precisely the same as
+1 on community. Further, simple aggregation puts higher weight on the category with the most
number of indicators. For example, strengths under employee relations has twelve indicators while
strengths under human rights have only four indicators. Therefore, aggregating the categories by
simply summing them up into an index (as is unfortunately common practice in the literature)
could result in potentially erroneous representation of the firm’s CSR activity. To mitigate these
methodological challenges, we follow (Prakash, Ravi, and Zhao 2017) to extract two principal
components as a proxy for symbolic and substantive CSR.
Principal components analysis (PCA) identifies factors that maximize explanatory power within
a set of related variables (See Appendix E showing the correlations between strengths and concerns
for CSR dimensions). To facilitate aggregation of information across the categories and, more im-
portantly, to facilitate comparison across years, we standardize the ratings within each year by
calculating z-scores. Using eigenvalue one condition we find that exactly two principal compo-
nents fit the criteria. Based on PCA, we extract two complementary components that emerge for
each firm-year and from the twelve transformed variables. Appendix F describes the PCA factor
loadings and communalities across the CSR categories. These two components explain on aver-
age about 33% of all the variability across the twelve categories. The first principal component
quantifies the commonality across the CSR strengths and CSR concerns (it loads positively on all
strengths and concerns, except diversity concerns). We label the first component as Symbolic CSR
(Sym CSR), because it may be interpreted to include those firm practices that address the current
concerns caused by a firm’s activities specially in response to some socially irresponsible behav-
ior. In other words, symbolic CSR strategies represent the immediate organizational responses to
stakeholder concerns after an incident of socially irresponsible behavior is publicly exposed. The
second component quantifies the contrasts across the CSR strengths and CSR concerns. It loads
positively on all CSR concerns and negatively on all CSR strengths. We label the additive inverse
of the second component as Substantive CSR (Sub CSR), because it may be interpreted to include a
76
broad array of CSR practices that are independent of current concerns in a firm while contributing
to a firm’s unique CSR strengths over time. In this context, we need to note that substantive CSR
is the inverse of the second component from PCA. Table 4.1 provides the sample distribution of
firms and CSR initiation over the sample period. Table 4.1 shows that no single year dominates the
sample. Across the sample period, it is notable that percentage of firms initiating symbolic CSR
rapidly increases from 30.78% in 2000 to 36.45% in 2005 followed by a decline during the finan-
cial crisis. The percentage of firms initiating substantive CSR increases rapidly and also declines
during the financial crisis. Post financial crisis, firms initiate both symbolic and substantive CSR
given the rising trend and awareness towards CSR.
4.3.3. Stock Returns and Firm Variables
The information about monthly stock returns, shares outstanding and trading volume is obtained
from CSRP and the financial statement data is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Annual stock return
are computed by annualizing monthly stock returns with dividends and after adjusting for delist-
ing. We include several firm-level controls in our analysis. We use return on assets (ROA) and
Tobin’s Q to proxy firm performance and firm value. As CSR investments may depress short term
performance (Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001), Tobin’s Q captures the long term benefits to firm value
resulting from CSR activities. Following (Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001), Tobin’s Q is calculated
as the market value of assets to book value of assets. Return on assets (ratio of operating income
before depreciation to total assets) captures the current performance. Firm leverage is an important
factor to CSR initiation and impacts stock returns (Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui 2013). Leverage
is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. We control for firm size (Ln(Total Assets))
as larger firms face a greater demand for communication and thus have more incentives to ini-
tiate CSR activities. Following (Padgett and Galan 2010), we control for R&D expenses (R&D
expenses to sales) because it complements CSR in offering competitive advantage. We also con-
trol for firm age to control for the life cycle of firms. Further, we control for revenue growth, the
average growth in sales volume and cash holding.
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 4.2 provides summary statistics
on symbolic and substantive CSR, stock returns and other key firm characteristics. To minimize
the impact of extreme outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at top and bottom 1%. The
variable symbolic CSR (Sym CSR) has a mean of 1.54 and median of 0.971. Substantive CSR
(Sub CSR) has a mean of 0.618 and a median of 0.472. The findings indicate the firms engage in
higher symbolic CSR than substantive CSR, consistent with (Li et al. 2019). The average annual
returns (Stock Returns) of the sample firms is 11.54%. Our sample firms have an average age of
around 20 years and earn 10.6% return on assets (ROA). The sample firms have an average firm
value (Tobin’s Q) of 3.406. This suggests that bigger, older and more profitable firms engage in
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CSR activities consistent with (Prakash, Ravi, and Zhao 2017). Panel B of Table 4.2 reports the
Spearman correlation coefficients for the main variables of interest. Symbolic CSR (Sym CSR) and
Substantive CSR (Sub CSR) are complementary principal components and have a low correlation
with other. We find that symbolic CSR is positively and significantly correlated to annual stock
returns while substantive CSR-stock returns share a negative but insignificant correlation. This
suggests that the stock market reacts positively to symbolic CSR.
4.4. Regression Results
4.4.1. Baseline Analysis
In this section we examine the impact of symbolic and substantive CSR on stock returns in a
multivariate setting controlling for a set of firm characteristics. The dependent variable is Stock
Returns (Stock Returns) for each-firm year. The main variable of interest is symbolic (Sym CSR)
and Substantive CSR (Sub CSR) obtained as two principal components from principal component
analysis on strengths and concerns of MSCI CSR categories. We start by running the following
OLS regression model:
Stock Returnsit = β0 +β1 SymCSR/SubCSR+∑β2 Zit + εit (4.1)
Where Zit is a vector of control variables defined in the previous section. We include Fama-French
12 industry and year fixed effects to control for variations in economic operations for our sample
firms across industries and years. We report test statistics and significance levels based on standard
errors clustered by firm and year levels (Petersen 2009).
Table 4.3 provides the OLS regression results from equation 4.1. In column (1) of Table 4.3, the
coefficient of symbolic CSR (Sym CSR) is positive and significant (0.010) at 10% level. However,
the coefficient of substantive CSR (Sub CSR) in column (2) is negative and significant (-0.096)
at 10% level. The findings suggest that difference in motive behind CSR activities impact mar-
ket returns. Specifically, we find that symbolic CSR investments positively impact annual stock
returns while substantive CSR is found to have a negative CSR-stock market relation, consistent
with over-investment hypothesis. Investment in symbolic CSR includes firm practices that address
the current concerns caused by a firm’s activities especially in response to some socially irrespon-
sible behavior. In other words, symbolic CSR strategies represent the immediate organizational
responses to stakeholder concerns after an incident of socially irresponsible behavior is publicly
exposed. As such investments are undertaken to regain the lost reputation due to negative events,
it results in positive stock market reaction, consistent with stakeholder wealth maximization (Free-
man, Wicks, and Parmar 2004). Substantive CSR, on the other hand, can be interpreted to include a
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broad array of CSR practices that are independent of current concerns in a firm while contributing
to a firm’s unique CSR strengths over time. The negative substantive CSR stock return relation
is consistent with over-investment hypothesis. Hence, substantive CSR initiation is viewed as in-
vestments to extract private benefits and personal reputation at the expense of shareholder wealth
maximization (Barnea and Rubin 2010).
There has been a general trend towards higher societal and environmental consciousness over
the past two decades.(Flammer 2012) suggests that with increased external pressure and institu-
tional norm to go green, the shareholder rewards to initiate CSR investments by firms declines. In
addition, the financial crisis immensely changed markets perspective towards CSR. Hence, we di-
vide the sample in two time subgroups: One with the sample period from 2000-2006 and the other
from 2009-2013. Table 4.3 also provides the regression results for the two sub samples. The CSR-
stock return relationship has changed over the sample period. For the sample period 2000-2006 as
shown in column (3), the coefficient of symbolic CSR (Sym CSR) is positive and significant (0.054)
at 1% level while for the sample period 2009-2013, the coefficient of symbolic CSR (Sym CSR) in
column (5) is positive but significant (0.005) only at 10% level. Consistent with (Flammer 2012),
we find that the positive stock market reaction towards symbolic CSR initiation reduced signifi-
cantly over time. Over the past two decades there has been an increased pressure for companies to
accomplish the dual objectives of societal objectives and shareholder wealth maximization. Any
initiation in CSR is thus viewed as expected and result in less significant stock market reaction.
Columns (4) and (6) provides the regression results of substantive CSR-stock market relation for
the two sub sample periods. The coefficient of substantive CSR in column (4) and (6) is negative
and significant at 5% level for both sample periods. This suggests that investment in substantive
CSR is viewed as manifestation of agency conflict and thus results in a negative stock market
reaction consistent with over-investment hypothesis.
Overall, the results suggests that differences in motives behind CSR initiation impact the an-
nual stock returns. Symbolic CSR initiation mainly to ‘fix the problem’ post media attention to
negative CSR events is viewed positively and is more likely to result in positive stock returns.
Substantive CSR investments are considered a manifestation of agency undertaken by managers to
gain personal reputation at the expense of shareholder wealth maximization. As a result, invest-
ments in substantive CSR are negatively associated to annual stock returns. We also find changing
perspectives of investors towards CSR investments. With increased external pressure to conform
to societal objectives, initiation in symbolic CSR is rewarded less by stock market over time.
4.4.2. Change in CSR-Stock Return Analysis
(Cochran and Wood 1984) points out an issue with using yearly CSR level as the dependent vari-
able. Based on one of the tenants of market efficiency hypothesis, even if CSR leads to enhanced
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firm value, the market reacts to changes in firm’s CSR ratings. To mitigate the above concern, we
use change in CSR over the sample period as the dependent variable. For each of the firm year ob-
servation, we calculate change in symbolic CSR (Change SymCSR) as the difference in symbolic
CSR for each firm-year observation in year t and year t-1. Change in substantive CSR (Change
SubCSR) is calculated as the difference between the level of substantive CSR for each firm-year
observation in year t and year t-1. We then estimate the OLS regression model as follows:
Stock Returnsit = γ0 + γ1/,ChangeSymCSRit/ChangeSubCSRit +∑γ2 Zit + εit (4.2)
Table 4.4 provides the regression results from equation (4.2). In column (1), the coefficient
of Change Sym CSR is positive and significant (0.120) at 5% level. Consistent with the baseline
regression, change in symbolic CSR positively impact annual stock returns. In column (2), the
coefficient of Change Sub CSR is consistently negative and significant (-0.070) at 10% level. The
results affirms that stock market reaction to CSR investments is moderated by the motive behind
CSR initiation. Symbolic CSR include firm practices that addresses the current concerns caused
by a firm’s activities in response to some socially irresponsible behavior. The immediate organi-
zational responses to stakeholder concerns after an incident of socially irresponsible behavior is
publicly exposed and has a positive impact on stock returns. Substantive CSR on the other hand
is interpreted to include a broad array of CSR practices that are independent of current concerns
in a firm while contributing to a firm’s unique CSR strengths over time. These practices attract a
negative market response consistent with over-investment hypothesis. Such investments are con-
sidered as an attempt to over-invest in CSR to be entrenched as socially responsible managers at
the expense of shareholders.
Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Table 4.4 presents the changing CSR stock returns relationship
over time. For the sample period 2000-2006, the coefficient of Change sym CSR in column (3) is
positive and significant at 1% level. However, for the sample period 2009-2013, the coefficient of
Change Sym CSR in column (5) is positive but is insignificant. Consistent with (Flammer 2012),
with increased external pressure and institutional norm to go green in recent times, the shareholder
rewards to initiate CSR investments by firms declines. Consistently, we also find the stock market
reaction to change in substantive CSR becomes less negative with time.
4.4.3. CSR-Stock Market Relation: Dual Beta Model
(Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo 2017) posit that high CSR firms build trust between a firm and its
shareholders, that results in stock returns four to seven percentage points higher during financial
crisis relative to low CSR firms. They affirm that a firms’ social capital helps build stakeholder
trust and cooperation, which results in a higher payoff when being trustworthy is more valuable,
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like 2007 financial crisis. (Flammer 2012) also asserts that rising external pressure to conform to
CSR has led stock market to reward less for CSR initiations by firms and amplify shareholders’
reaction to announcement of negative events.
The CSR stock market relation can suffer due to this rebalancing. With difference stock market
reaction to increase and decrease in CSR, we re-examine the impact of change in CSR on annual
stock returns using dual beta model (Bhardwaj and Brooks 1993). Dual-beta model was initially
used as an extension to CAPM (Markowitz 1952; Sharpe 1964) to adjust for risk differences in bull
and bear markets. As the loss aversion is more pronounced, (Estrada 2007) constructs downward
beta which captures the sensitivity to the market when market returns are negative or below a
threshold. Prior research further finds that use of downward beta better measures the risk sensitivity
to the market changes (Galagedera 2009; Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post 2004). As the intensity
of stock market reaction to negative events and CSR initiations is different, we further examine
the stock market reaction to increase and decrease in CSR initiations. To segregate the upward
and downward change in CSR, we create indicator variables representing positive and negative
change in symbolic and substantive CSR. Specifically, we create indicator variables D+SymCSR
and D-SymCSR for positive and negative change in symbolic CSR. D+SymCSR takes the value of
one if there is a positive change in symbolic CSR between year t-1 and year t, and zero otherwise.
D-SymCSR on the other hand takes the value of one if there is a negative change in symbolic CSR
between year t-1 and year t, zero otherwise. Similarly, we also create indicator variables for change










+β−2 NegChangeSymCSRit/NegChangeSubCSR+∑β3 Zit + εit
)
(4.3)
Where Pos Change SymCSR is the positive change in symbolic CSR from year t-1 to year t, Neg Change SymCSR
is the negative change in symbolic CSR from t-1 to year t. Similarly, we also segregate change in
substantive CSR in Pos Change SubCSR and Neg Change SubCSR. We control for firm variables in
the previous regressions.
Table 4.5 provides the results from the dual beta model. In column (1), the coefficient for the
Pos Change SymCSR is positive and significant at 10% level while Neg Change SymCSR is negative
and significant at 1% level. The findings show the differences in stock market reaction to increase
and decrease in CSR activities. The different reactions to increase and decrease in symbolic CSR
activities may be caused by the fact that symbolic CSR is viewed as expense to repair the firm’s
reputational damage. Shareholders consider symbolic CSR as a good strategy to distract media
attention from corporate controversy and hence any reduction is symbolic CSR leads to negative
stock returns. By contract, substantive CSR initiates larger changes in the firms and the associated
costs may exceeds the benefits in the short term. In column (2) an increase in substantive CSR
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thus is negatively related to stock returns. Consistent with (Flammer 2012), we also find change
in investors’ expectations and rewards to firms to initiate CSR investments. For the sample period
2009-2013, investment in symbolic CSR does not lead to a significant change in stock returns.
This may be caused by rising pressure on corporations to engage in CSR activities. Any symbolic
CSR investment is viewed as expected and the no additional rewards in the form of stock returns
is found. In contract, a decline in substantive CSR, as shown in column (6) is negatively related to
stock returns but is not significant. This suggests the increasing awareness among investors about
CSR directed towards corporate philanthropy and thus no longer invites negative reaction from the
stock market.
Overall, the results suggest that market reaction to symbolic and substantive CSR is different.
Shareholders recognize the motive behind CSR activities and rewards based on their perception
of the impact of CSR on firm value. Bad image that results from corporate controversies lead
managers to indulge in symbolic CSR. Shareholders react positively on the firms’ action to ‘fix
the problem’ and hence a positive symbolic CSR stock return relationship is obtained. Substantive
CSR on the other hand, initiates larger changes in the firms and the associated costs may exceed its
benefits in the short run and are considered an over-investment by the managers to gain personal
reputation at the cost of shareholder wealth maximization. This leads to a negative relation between
substantive CSR and stock returns. Further, the results also show the changing perceptions of
investors towards CSR over the decades. With increased external pressure, firms are rewarded less
for positive CSR activities but are punished more for negative events.
4.4.4. Portfolio-Based Approach
In addition to the above results, we use the portfolio-based approach to analyze the impact of sym-
bolic and substantive CSR on stock returns. We follow the methodology of (Gompers and Lerner
2003) based on grouping stocks with similar characteristics in portfolios. At the beginning of each
year, we build value weighted portfolios containing stocks with firms initiating 20% highest and
lowest symbolic and substantive CSR. Portfolio returns are subsequently calculated over the entire
year. The portfolio is reformed and recalculated every year. We also create a self-financing strategy
that is long on the portfolios of high symbolic and substantive CSR firms and short on portfolios of
low symbolic and substantive CSR firms. We then use the four-factor model of (Carhart 1997) to
analyze the performance of different portfolios. The four-factor model is an extension of the clas-
sical Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French 1992) with an additional factor to capture
the momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). The four-factor model is estimated as follows:
Returnpt = α +β1 p(RM−RF)t +β2 p(SMB)t +β3 p(HML)t +β4(MOM)t + εpt (4.4)
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Where Returnpt is the return of portfolio p minus risk free rate in year t. (RM-RF)t is the expected
market return minus the risk-free rate in year t. (SMB)t is the difference between the expected
return in year t of a portfolio of small-cap stocks and large-cap stocks.(HML)t is the difference
between the expected return in year t of a portfolio of stocks with high book-to-market and that
of a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market and (MOM)t is the difference between expected
return in year t of a portfolio with stocks having outperformed the previous year and having un-
derperformed the previous year. The data for RM, Rf, SMB, HML and MOM are obtained from
Kenneth French’s (2015) web page. Alpha measures the abnormal return.
The results of the analysis for value-weighted portfolios are presented in Table 4.6. Panel A of
Table 4.6 reports the results of a single factor model. We find that portfolio of firms initiating higher
symbolic CSR display a positive and significant alpha of 1.76% per annum, while the portfolio of
firms with higher substantive CSR yield a negative alpha of 1.08% per annum. Regarding the self-
finance strategy of long high CSR portfolios and short low CSR portfolios, it yields positive and
insignificant abnormal returns for symbolic CSR portfolio and negative but insignificant abnormal
returns for substantive CSR portfolios.
Panel B of Table 4.6 reports the results of four factor model. Consistent to one factor model, we
find the portfolio of firms initiating high symbolic CSR yields a positive and significant alpha of
1.8% after controlling for size, book-to-market and momentum responsible for generating excess
returns. Firms with low symbolic CSR yields a negative and significant alpha of 0.86% per annum.
For the portfolios of firms based on substantive CSR, we find portfolios initiating high substantive
CSR displays a negative and significant alpha of 1.37% per annum.
The results are consistent with the previous results suggesting differential market reaction to
symbolic and substantive CSR. Shareholders recognize the motive behind CSR activities and re-
ward based on their perception of the impact of CSR on firm value. Bad image that results from
corporate controversies lead managers to indulge in symbolic CSR. Shareholders react positively
on the firms’ action to ‘fix the problem’ and hence a positive symbolic CSR stock return relation-
ship is obtained. Substantive CSR on the other hand, initiates larger changes in the firms and the
associated costs may exceed its benefits in the short run and are considered an over-investment
by the managers to gain personal reputation at the cost of shareholder wealth maximization. This
leads to a negative relation between substantive CSR and stock returns.
4.5. Additional Analysis
The above results suggests that differential impact of symbolic and substantive CSR on stock re-
turns is attributed to the motive behind CSR initiations. Symbolic CSR incurs less expenses, repairs
the firm’s reputational damage and receives a positive stock market reaction. Substantive CSR ini-
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tiates larger changes in the firm associated with not just window-dressing but reflects activities
to encompass societal objectives with other business objectives. Substantive CSR is perceived as
over-investment by managers for their personal gain at the cost of shareholder’s expense leading
to negative substantive CSR-stock return relation.
In this section, we examine the impact of symbolic and substantive CSR on stock returns for
family firms. Family firms are characterized by their ownership identity and favorable reputation,
which shape their actions towards shareholders. Moving beyond agency theory, family firms are
found to initiate higher level of CSR and ethical behavior to strengthen firm reputation for the long
term (Dyer and Whetten 2006; McGuire, Dow, and Ibrahim 2012). To the extent that substantive
CSR can be symptomatic of worsening agency problems or genuine corporate philanthropy, poten-
tially driven by long term reputational goals, it is important to understand if the market is capable
of differentiating between the two effects. We posit that family firms may capitalize on their stake-
holders’ positive perspective relative to non-family firms and any investment in both symbolic and
substantive CSR will have a positive impact of stock returns.
(Anderson and Reeb 2003) suggest that controlling families are long term investors and often
control senior management positions. Thus, management in such firms are more likely to have
incentives to improve long-term value as well as the ability to influence firm decisions to that end.
We investigate the impact of symbolic and substantive investments on stock returns of family firms.
Table 4.7 provides the sample statistics and regression results for the sub sample of family
firms. Panel A of Table 4.7 shows the distribution of family firms over the sample period and the
percentage of family firms initiating symbolic and substantive CSR. We find relative to the com-
plete sample, family firms relatively engage in lower symbolic CSR and higher substantive CSR.
Family firms seek out to build and maintain long-term relations with its stakeholders. Investment
in substantive CSR allow family firms to build a positive image in collaboration and trust of key
stakeholders consistent with (Cennamo et al. 2012; McGuire, Dow, and Ibrahim 2012). Panel B
of Table 4.7 reports the OLS regression results. We find the coefficient of symbolic CSR (Sym
CSR) in column (1) is negative but insignificant and the coefficient of substantive CSR (Sub CSR)
in column (2) is positive and significant (0.023) at 5% level. The finding suggest that stock returns
are positively related to substantive CSR for a subset of family firms consistent with our hypothe-
sis. Family firms engage in CSR to build and maintain long-term relations with their stakeholders.
Unlike non-family firms, investment in substantive CSR by family firms is not linked with over-
investment by managers for private gains and thus are positively related to stock returns.
This result thus reinforces our starting premise that the market‘s reaction to CSR is conditioned
on the perceived intent driving that action. Investments undertaken by managers with the view to




This paper explores the stock market impact of CSR activities. Prior research investigating the
factors underlying CSR activities and the impact on firm value yields mixed results creating scope
for future search. Based on the sample of public US firms from 2000-2013, our results indicate
that shareholders react based on firm’s choice (symbolic and substantive) towards CSR activities.
Following a negative controversy, firms are more likely to engage in symbolic CSR. Our findings
indicate that a firm’s symbolic engagement leads to positive market reaction. In contrast, substan-
tive CSR is more likely to perceive as over-investment by managers to extract private benefits at
the cost of shareholder wealth and is negatively associated with stock returns. In addition, our
findings also indicate that for the subset of family firms, investment in symbolic CSR receives a
positive response from the stock market. The findings indicate that for family firms, engagement
in substantive CSR helps them to strengthen their long –term relations with stakeholders.
Although our findings improve on prior research, they are not without their own shortcomings.
CSR activity in itself driven by the circumstances encountered by the firm. Therefore, there is
clearly a need for a more complex model that can incorporate the endogeneity inherent in the
firm’s choice of its levels of CSR activity. We look forward to future research that can address this
issue.
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Table 4.1: Sample Distribution
The Table provides the firm-year distribution of our sample firms by calendar year. The Table also









2000 1,133 30.78% 45.67%
2001 1,123 31.12% 47.42%
2002 1,108 32.59% 50.64%
2003 2,013 34.37% 51.66%
2004 2,063 35.57% 52.36%
2005 2,062 36.45% 52.66%
2006 2,036 35.64% 52.60%
2007 2,033 30.79% 44.00%
2008 2,072 25.26% 40.14%
2009 2,083 31.20% 45.66%
2010 2,012 35.85% 49.30%
2011 2,102 36.49% 49.47%
2012 2,090 36.58% 55.98%
2013 1,893 37.52% 56.80%
Total 25,823
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
The Table reports the summary statistics of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and other firm-level char-
acteristics. Panel A provides the mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for
symbolic and substantive CSR and other firm-level characteristics. Panel B reports the pairwise correlation
of the main variables.The symbol * indicate statistical significance at 10% and under.




Mean Median StDev 25th Pcnt 75th Pcnt
Sym CSR 25,823 1.54 0.971 1.734 0.991 1.238
Sub CSR 25,823 0.618 0.472 1.139 -0.461 0.445
Stock Returns 25,811 .1154 0.587 1.637 -0.178 0.299
Ln (Assets) 25,823 7.387 7.272 1.751 6.12 8.42
Leverage 25,823 0.221 0.180 0.225 0.038 0.332
ROA 25,823 0.106 0.116 0.186 0.063 0.172
Tobin’s Q 25,823 3.406 2.203 6.466 1.418 3.610
Firm age 23,370 19.91 20 6.566 17 24
Sales Growth 17,938 0.448 0.081 28.07 -0.004 0.194
R&D Exp 16,197 0.684 0.031 10.352 0.034 0.134
Cash Flow to Assets 22,863 0.032 0.0431 0.152 0.003 0.089
Panel B: Pairwise Correlation
Variables Sym CSR Sub CSR St Ret Ln(Assets) Leverage ROA Tobin’s Q Firm age
Sym CSR 1
Sub CSR -0.0010 1
Stock Returns 0.409* -0.0069 1
Ln (Assets) 0.5640* 0.0380* 0.0412* 1
Leverage 0.0627* -0.0523* 0.0482* 0.2104* 1
ROA 0.0858* 0.0185* 0.1474* 0.1567* -0.0140* 1
Tobin’s Q 0.0019 0.0051 0.0068 0.0028 0.0066 0.0128* 1
Firm age 0.1545* 0.0944* -0.0342* 0.1720* 0.0179* 0.0904* -0.0010 1
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Table 4.3: Impact of Symbolic and Substantive CSR on Stock Returns: OLS Regression
The Table reports the OLS regression results estimating the impact of symbolic and substantive CSR
on annual stock returns. Annualized stock return is the dependent variable and symbolic (Sym CSR)
and substantive CSR (Sub CSR) are the main variables of interest.We control for other firm-level char-
acteristics. The regression is run for the entire sample and for the two sub periods 2000-2006 and
2009-2013.The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var Stock Returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




































































































































No of obs 22,862 22,862 10,288 10,288 12,574 12,574
R-Squared 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.19
Industry/Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.4: Impact of change in symbolic and substantive CSR on stock returns: OLS Regres-
sion
The Table reports the panel regression results on the relation between the change in symbolic and substan-
tive CSR on annual stock returns. Change in symbolic CSR (Change Sym CSR) is calculated as the differ-
ence between symbolic CSR in year t-1 and year t. Change in substantive CSR (Change Sub CSR) is also
calculated as the difference between substantive CSR in year t-1 and year t .We control for other firm-level
characteristics. The regression is run for the entire sample and for the two sub periods 2000-2006 and 2009-
2013.The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var Stock Returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




































































































































No of obs 16,787 16,787 7,554 7,554 9,232 9,232
R-Squared 0.36 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.22
Industry/Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.5: Impact of change in symbolic and substantive CSR on stock returns: Dual-Beta
Model
The Table reports the Dual-beta model results to compare the impact of increase and decrease in symbolic
and substantive CSR on annual stock returns. Change in symbolic and substantive CSR is segregated into
positive change, if the level of symbolic and substantive CSR increases from year t-1 to t and negative
change, if the level of symbolic and substantive CSR decreases from year t-1 to t.The Dual-beta model com-
pares the market reaction to increase and decrease in CSR initiation by firms.The regression is run for the
entire sample and for the two sub periods 2000-2006 and 2009-2013.The symbol ***,**,* indicate statisti-
cal significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dep Var Stock Returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


















































































































































No of obs 16,787 16,787 7,554 7,554 9,232 9,232
R-Squared 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.21
Industry/Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4.6: Impact of Symbolic and Substantive CSR on Stock Returns: Portfolio Based Analysis
The Table shows the one-factor model and abnormal returns using (Carhart 1997) four-factor model for portfolios engaging in high CSR and low
CSR. Panel A presents the results of one factor model. We first form the portfolio of stocks investing in high CSR (top 20%) and low CSR (bottom
20%). Portfolio performance is measured using annual stock returns Abnormal returns are computed using a single factor model.Rm-Rf is the
difference between the market return and the risk-free rate. Alpha measures the abnormal returns for the portfolios. We also use a self-financing
strategy of long high CSR portfolio and short low CSR portfolios to compute the difference in abnormal returns for the strategy. Panel B reports the
result of four factor model. The factors Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and MOM are obtained from Kenneth French’s (2015) website. The symbol ***,**,*
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.








































No of obs 16 16 16 16 16 16
R-Squared 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.21
Industry/Year
Fixed Effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Years 16 16 16 16 16 16
R-Squared 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.22 0.19
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Table 4.7: Impact of Symbolic and Substantive CSR on stock returns: Evidence using family
firms
The Table provides descriptive statistics and panel regression results examining the impact of CSR on stock re-
turns using a sample of family firms. Panel A provides the frequency distribution of family firms by calendar year
and the percentage of firm-year observations investing in symbolic and substantive CSR. Panel B provides the
OLS regression results of the impact of symbolic and substantive CSR on annualized stock returns for sample of
family firms. We control for firm-level characteristics.The symbol ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.






% of family firm-year
obs with SymCSR
% of family firm-year
obs with SubCSR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2000 1,133 10.15% 25.21% 47.89%
2001 1,123 11.25% 25.61% 48.65%
2002 1,108 13.56% 26.87% 49.12%
2003 2,013 12.98% 25.97% 52.14%
2004 2,063 13.45% 24.54% 54.41%
2005 2,062 13.19% 23.76% 55.14%
2006 2,036 14.06% 22.98% 56.14%
2007 2,033 14.65% 23.45% 55.61%
2008 2,072 13.87% 25.61% 52.12%
2009 2,083 13.45% 25.87% 56.14%
2010 2,012 14.14% 24.56% 58.12%
2011 2,102 14.09% 23.65% 60.13%
2012 2,090 14.76% 22.65% 61.15%
2013 1,893 15.45% 21.96% 63.74%
Total 25,823
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Panel B: Impact of Symbolic and Substantive CSR on Stock Returns: Regression Analysis
Dep Var: Stock Returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)























































































































No of obs 3,518 3,518 1,583 1,583 1,934 1,934
R-Squared 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.18
Industry/year
Fixed effects




This thesis advances scholarship on women and leadership by analyzing the challenges women
and occupational minorities face during their career path to top leadership positions and also after
attaining those positions. We examine whether the barriers that women CEOs face in the form
of glass ceiling impact firm performance and corporate social responsibility. We also examine
if the challenges women CEOs face in the form of glass cliff impact their earnings management
practices.
Our first essay asks if the difference in obstacles men and women CEOs face on their route
to top leadership positions results in the superior performance of firms led by women CEOs. The
existence of glass-ceiling in organizational hierarchies potentially subjects women candidates to
high levels of discrimination, vis-a-vis their male counterparts. This potentially prevents a dispro-
portionately large number of female candidates from making it to the top. Those who do make it
are of potentially higher caliber than their average male counterparts in that position. Therefore,
arguably, the glass-ceiling manifests in the form of superior performance of the average women
in the position of leadership. Our results show that if we divide the sample of CEOs by gender
(male vs. female) and ethnicity (white vs. non-white), we find that the average non-white female
CEOs (two levels of discrimination: gender and ethnicity) emerge as the best performers followed
by white female CEOs and non-white male CEOs. In contrast, the average white-male CEO (no
glass ceiling discrimination) depicts the worst performance. We also examine if the barriers occu-
pational minority CEOs face on their route to the top shape their managerial traits in the form of
CSR initiations. We find that because occupational minority CEOs face higher performance pres-
sures, negative evaluations and lower job security than their white-male counterparts, they initiate
higher symbolic and substantive CSR to increase their reputation and strengthen relations with
stakeholders.
The second essay examines if gender discrimination after women are elevated to positions of
power impacts financial reporting quality. Specifically, we extend the literature by using role con-
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gruity theory and glass cliff hypothesis to examine the earnings management behavior of female
chief executive officers (CEOs) conditional on the power they hold. Role congruity theory suggests
that individuals are judged with respect to the congruence between their characteristics dictated by
their gender stereotypes and the requirements of the job that they occupy. Women CEOs engaging
in earnings management creates incongruity between feminine stereotypes and masculine qualities
of a leader. This leads to negative expectations and evaluations about the performance of women
CEOs. Prior studies find that power acts as a stimulus that can shift managers’ focus, we there-
fore surmise that CEO gender and earnings management relationship distorts with increased CEO
power. That is, in a powerful CEO setting, women CEOs are subject to less scrutiny and have an
opportunity to influence the decision-making process.
Using propensity score matched sample, instrumental variable analysis and difference-in-difference
analysis, we show that female CEOs do not necessarily reduce earnings management. For CEOs
holding less power, women CEOs demonstrate lower earnings management relative to their male
counterparts. However with increased power, we find women and male CEOs exhibit similar
earnings management behaviors. We, therefore, add to the exiting gender-diversity literature by
showing that earnings management behaviors of women CEOs are not solely dictated by their risk-
taking and ethical attitudes, but by the existence of glass cliffs which imposes high demands on
women CEOs to conform to their gender roles.
The third essay examines the stock price changes to the firm’s strategic choice towards sym-
bolic and substantive CSR. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has continued to gain importance
in managerial practice over the last several decades. While early studies treated CSR as an obli-
gation on businesses to pursue policies that are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of
society, subsequent ones contend that CSR is ‘fundamentally subversive’ of the true responsibili-
ties of business. We examine the relationship between the firm’s stock price performance and CSR
based on intent or motive behind CSR initiations. Firms strategically utilize symbolic and sub-
stantive CSR to either repair reputational damage following negative societal events or undertake
actions intended to integrate CSR in the overall business objectives. Our findings indicate that the
market responds positively to symbolic CSR while negatively to substantive CSR. Media atten-
tion towards negative firm events puts a corporation’s reputation at risk and firms engagement in
symbolic CSR acts as a quick response from the firm to show that it is doing something to ‘fix the
problem’. This results in a positive response from the market leading to positive symbolic CSR-
annual stock returns relationship. Substantive CSR, on the other hand often requires subsequent
changes in operations, systems and processes. Such investments require a high level of coordina-
tion and integration. The cost of implementing substantive CSR may be higher than the benefits
in the short-term and leads shareholders’ to view it as a manifestation of agency. We further ex-
plore the impact of CSR activity on the stock price by examining the subset of family firms in our
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sample. Since family firms are expected to have a long-term outlook with a deep interest in the
eventual survival and performance of the firm, we expect CSR activities, in particular substantive
CSR activities, are not perceived as agency costs. Consistent with our conjecture we find that the
negative association between substantive CSR and subsequent stock price performance is absent
for family firms.
Further, there has been a general trend towards higher societal and environmental conscious-
ness over the past two decades because of increased external pressure and institutional norm to go
green. Using a Dual-beta Model, we find that with rising pressure on corporations to engage in
CSR activities, investment in symbolic CSR is rewarded less by the stock market over the sample
period. In contrast, the negative relation between substantive CSR and stock returns diminishes
over the sample period as the awareness among investors about CSR directed towards corporate
philanthropy has increased over the sample period.
Our findings have several interesting implications for the literature on CSR activity. Firstly, we
find that crucial differences underlying CSR activities impact subsequent stock returns. Second,
we provide a detailed description of how the stock market reacts to CSR based on the intent or
motivation behind CSR activities. Our results indicate that there is a conflict of interest between
shareholders and managers with respect to the optimal level of CSR activity. Third, we also fill the
gap in the existing CSR-firm value relation literature. The existing empirical literature studying the
impact of CSR on firm value yields mixed evidence with some evidence pointing towards a positive
impact of CSR on firm value while some finding a negative or no market value-CSR relationship.
Our research contributes to this equivocal question by examining the CSR-stock return relation
moderated by the motive behind CSR initiations.
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Defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary
items (data item ib in Compustat) divided by the book value
of total assets (data item at in Compustat),
Tobin’s Q Defined as the ratio of market value of total assets to book value
of total assets. The market value of assets is calculated as the book
value of total assets (data item at in Compustat) minus the book value
of common equity (ceq) plus the number of
common shares outstanding (csho) times the stock price (prcc_f).
Symbolic CSR
(Sym CSR)
The first principal component extracted from the twelve categories
of CSR strengths and concerns, recorded in the MSCI KLD database
Substantive CSR
(Sub CSR)
The additive inverse of the second principal component extracted
from the twelve categories of CSR strengths and concerns,
recorded in the MSCI KLD database
Ln(Assets) Natural Logarithm of Total assets (data item at in Compustat)
Leverage Defined as the sum of long-term debt(data item dltt in Compustat)
plus debt in current liabilities (dlc) divided as market value of equity




Computed as 3 year rolling standard deviation of return of assets (ROA)
to measure the riskiness of firm’s investment decisions
Sales Growth
Defined as the ratio of sales (data item sale in Compustat) in the current
fiscal year to sales in the last year minus 1
Tangibility Defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets
Capital Exp
(CapEx)
Computed as the capital expenditure for a firm in a year
(data item Capx in Compustat),divided by net sales for the year
Board Size Natural logarithm of total number of directors serving
on a corporate board
Fraction of
ind directors
The number of directors indicated as independent directors
by ISS database, divided by the total number of directors
Fraction of female
directors
The number of female directors serving on a corporate board divided
by the total number of directors.
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B. Description of variables and their computation for Chapter 3
Variables Description
CEO Duality An indicator variable which takes the value of one in firm-years where the
CEO is also chairing the board, zero otherwise
CEO Payslice A measure of CEO power computed as the ratio of CEO pay
(tdc1 in Execucomp)to the total pay awarded to top
five executives including the CEO
Absolute Discretionary
Accruals (AbsDA)
Discretionary accruals are computed based on the cross-sectional
performance-adjusted modified Jones Model estimated using
firms in the Fama French 17 industry and year
Real earnings
management (Real EM)
Computed as the sum of abnormal discretionary expenses (multiplied by -1)
and abnormal production costs(calculated as the estimated residuals
using equations 3.1 and 3.2
CEO Female An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO in the firm-year
observation is female, zero otherwise
CEO age Age of CEO in years as depicted by ISS database
CEO tenure Computed as the number of years since the CEO’s appointment
Board Size Natural logarithm of total number of directors serving on Corporate board
Fraction of ind
directors
Computed as the number of directors indicated as independent
by the ISS database, divided by the total number of directors
Frac of female
directors
Computed as the ratio of number of female directors
serving the corporate board, divided by the total number of directors.
Standard Dev of
Operating Cash Flow
Computed as 3 year rolling standard deviation of operating cash flow
to measure the riskiness of firm’s investment decisions
Z-Score Measures the financial strength of the company. Computed as
1.2*(working capital/total assets)+1.4*(retained earnings/total assets)+
3.3*(earnings before interest and taxes/total assets)
+0.6*(Market value of equity/total liabilities) + 1*(Sales/total assets)
E-index Entrenchment index based on six antitakeover provisions in the
ISS governance database: Staggered board, poison pills,
supermajority requirements for mergers, limits to shareholder
bylaw amendments, limits to the charter bylaw amendments
and golden parachutes.
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The first principal component extracted from the twelve categories
of CSR strengths and concerns, recorded in the MSCI KLD database
Substantive CSR
(Sub CSR)
The additive inverse of the second principal component extracted
from the twelve categories of CSR strengths and concerns,
recorded in the MSCI KLD database.
Change SymCSR Calculated as the difference between symbolic CSR in
the current fiscal year and the symbolic CSR last year
Change SubCSR Calculated as the difference between substantive CSR
in the current fiscal year and the substantive CSR last year
Annual Stock returns Annualized Monthly returns computed as the geometric
average of monthly returns obtained from CRSP database
Leverage Defined as the sum of long term debt (data item dltt in Compustat) and
debt in current liabilities (data item dlc in Compustat), divided by total
book assets (data item at in Compustat)
Cash flow to Assets Computed as the net operating cash flow (data item oancf in Compustat),
divided by total assets (data item at in Compustat)
Family Firm An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm-year
observation is listed as family firm using Ron Anderson’s webpage
Excess Return on
Market
Market excess return is the market return in excess of risk-free rate in year t,
obtained from Kenneth French’s (2015) web page
Size Factor (SMB) Size factor is the difference between the value-weighted return
of a portfolio of small stocks and the value-weighted return of
a portfolio of large stocks in the year t, obtained from
Kenneth French’s (2015) web page
Book-to Market
Factor (HML)
Book-to-Market factor is the difference between the value-weighted
return of a portfolio of high B/M stocks and the value-weighted
return of a portfolio of low B/M stocks for the year t,
obtained from Kenneth French’s (2015) web page
Momentum Factor
(MOM)
Momentum factor is the difference between the value-weighted
return of a portfolio of stocks with high returns during year t-1
and the value-weighted return of a portfolio of stocks with high
returns during year t-1, obtained from Kenneth French’s (2015) web page
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Corruption & Political Instability
Financial System Instability
Limited Compensation (1991 to 2009)
Ownership Strength (1991 to 2009)
Political Accountability (2005 to 2009)
Public Policy Strength (2007 to 2011)
Reporting Quality (from 1996)
Other Strengths (1991 to 2009)
Accounting (2005 to 2009)
Business Ethics
Controversial Investments
Governance Structures (from 2010)
High Compensation (1991 to 2009)
Ownership (1991 to 2009)
Political Accountability (2005 to 2007)
Public Policy (2007 to 2011)
Reporting Quality (from 2005)
Other Concerns (from 1992)
Community Charitable Giving (1991 to 2011)
Community Engagement (from 2010)
Innovative Giving (from 1991)
Non-US Charitable Giving (1994 to 2009)
Support for Education (1994 to 2009)
Support for Housing (1991 to 2009)
Volunteer Programs (2005 to 2009)
Other Strengths (1991 to 2011)
Community Impact (from 1991)
Investment Controversies (1991 to 2009)
Tax Disputes (1991 to 2009)
Other Concerns (1991 to 2009)
Diversity Board of Directors – Gender/Minorities (from 1991)
CEO (1991 to 2009)
Employment (Disabled) (1991 - 2009)
Employment of Underrepresented Groups (from 2010)
Gay & Lesbian Policies (1995 to 2011)
Promotion (1991 to 2011)
Women and Minority Contracting (from 1991)
Work-Life Benefits (1991 to 2011)
Other Strengths (from 1991)
Board of Directors – Gender/Minorities (from 1991)
Non-Representation (1993 to 2011)
Workforce Diversity (from 1991)
Other Concerns (1991 to 2009)
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Category Strengths Concerns
Employee relations Cash Profit Sharing (from 1991)
Compensation & Benefits
Employee Health and Safety (from 2003)
Employee Involvement (from 1991)
Employee Relations
Human Capital Management
No-Layoff Policy (1991 to 1993)
Professional Development
Retirement Benefits (1991 to 2009)
Supply Chain Labor Standards (from 2002)
Union Relations (from 1991)
Other Strength (1991 to 2011)
Child Labor
Employee Health & Safety (from 1991)
Labor-Management Relations
Retirement Benefits Concern (1992 to 2009)
Supply Chain (from 1998)
Union Relations (from 1991)
Workforce Reductions (1991 to 2009)
Environment Biodiversity & Land Use
Climate Change (from 1991)
Environmental Management Systems (from 2006)
Environmental Opportunities (from 1991)
Packaging Materials & Waste (from 1991)
Property, Plant, Equipment (1991 to 1995)
Raw Material Sourcing
Waste Management (from 1991)
Water Stress
Other Strengths (from 1991)
Agriculture Chemicals (1991 to 2009)
Biodiversity & Land Use (from 2010)
Climate Change (from 1999)
Hazardous Waste (1991 to 2009)
Impact of Products & Services (from 2010)
Operational Waste (from 2010)
Ozone Depleting Chemicals (1991 to 2009)
Regulatory Compliance (from 1991)
Supply Chain Management
Toxic Spills & Releases (from 1991)
Water Management
Other Concerns (from 1991)
Human Rights Human Rights Policies & Initiatives (from 1994)
Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength (from 2000)
Labor Rights Strength (2002 to 2009)
Positive Record in S. Africa (1994 to 1995)
Freedom of Expression & Censorship
Human Rights Violations
Indigenous Peoples Relations Concern (2000 to 2009)
Labor Rights Concern (1998 to 2009)
Mexico (1994 to 2001)
Northern Ireland (1991 to 1994)
Operations in Sudan (from 2010 to 2011)
South Africa (1991 to 1994)
Support for Controversial Regimes (from 1994)
Other Concerns (from 1994)
Product Access to Finance (from 1991)
Quality (from 1991)
R+D, Innovation (1991 to 2009)
Social Opportunities (from 1991)
Other Strengths (1991 to 2009)
Anti competitive Practices (from 1991)
Customer Relations
Marketing & Advertising (from 1991)
Product Quality & Safety (from 1991)
Other Concerns (from 1991)
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E. Correlation matrix of strengths and concerns for CSR dimensions in the MSCI KLD
database
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ENV str 1.000
ENV con -0.211* 1.000
COMP str 0.199* 0.7398* 1.000
COMP com -0.5913* 0.6319* 0.0035 1.000
EMP str 0.5906* -0.1479* 0.1192* -0.2959* 1.000
EMP con -0.6984* 0.3575* -0.2769* 0.7876* -0.5704* 1.000
DIV str -0.6066* 0.8043* 0.3091* 0.8399* -0.5640* 0.7149* 1.000
DIV con 0.5599* -0.2166* -0.0069 -0.4217* -0.3030* -0.2565* -0.2120* 1.000
PRO str 0.6030* -0.0037 0.5054* -0.5128* 0.8187* -0.7896* -0.5224* -0.1114* 1.000
PRO con -0.4061* -0.4061* 0.4798* 0.8396* -0.1873* 0.4723* 0.8525* -0.3569* -0.1944* 1.000
HUM str 0.7833* -0.4195* -0.0621* -0.5436* 0.9052* -0.6605* -0.7743* 0.0139* 0.7013* -0.4877* 1.000
HUM con -0.6189* 0.4682* 0.1577* 0.5397* -0.1951* 0.3844* 0.6171* -0.5981* -0.2798* 0.6081* -0.4141* 1.000
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F. Principal Component Analysis Factor Loadings and Communality
PC 1 is the first principal component and represents symbolic CSR. It loads positively on CSR strengths and
concerns. PC 2 loads negatively on strengths and positively on concerns. The inverse of PC 2 is interpreted
as substantive CSR. -1*PC 2 is the measure of substantive CSR.
CSR categories PC 1 PC 2 Communalities
com_con 0.456 0.468 0.426
div_con -0.205 0.413 0.213
emp_con 0.411 0.323 0.274
env_con 0.547 0.519 0.568
hum_con 0.447 0.304 0.292
pro_con 0.556 0.147 0.331
com_str 0.633 -0.286 0.482
div_str 0.686 -0.351 0.594
emp_str 0.587 -0.224 0.394
env_str 0.622 -0.043 0.388
hum_str 0.280 -0.130 0.096
pro_str 0.423 -0.346 0.298
Eigenvalues 3.086 1.270
% of variance 25.72% 10.58%
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